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INTRODUCTION: 
 
"We will never ever, never anywhere, never, ever are we going to render ourselves 
actively or passively dependent on the Sweden Democrats"  
Mona Sahlin (2010), former leader of the Swedish Social democrats 
On the 19th September 2010, the Swedish general election to the Riksdag (Swedish 
Parliament) created a national shock and a historic result: while the Social Democrats 
recorded one of their worst results since the 1920s, for the first time in history, the 
Sweden Democrats (SD) passed the 4% electoral threshold with 5,7% and won 20 seats 
in the Riksdag. Whereas the rise of nationalist and anti-immigration parties in Western 
European parliaments had become a kind of normalcy, it was a shock for Sweden whose 
political system has been able to prevent the rise of radical right-wing parties on the 
national level in contrast to most of its Nordic neighbors. 
In a 2012 article the German scholar of Swedish politics Bernd Henningsen 
(2012), warned the readers against the rise of radical right-wing populist parties in 
Northern Europe and the end of the myth of “Nortopia”. While radical right-wing 
populist parties have become more and more successful in all of Europe, the Nordic 
countries seemed to be the last bastions against right-wing radicalization, at least on the 
general perception. Nevertheless, this vision of Nordic politics has proved to verge 
more on the myth. 
Most academics agree on the fact that “political extremism is most likely a 
normal pathology of all democracies” (W. M. Downs, 2013) and since the 1990s, 
Radical Right Wing Populist Parties (RRWPP) have not only entered parliament, some 
of them have managed to become a support party for parliamentary coalitions or even 
be part of a governing coalition. This is indeed the case in Denmark, where the Danish 
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People’s Party has been a very important support party the Liberal-Conservative 
coalition governments under Lars Rasmussen or in Norway where the Norwegian 
Progress Party joined the governing Conservative and Progress parties after the 2013 
general elections. Much more recently in April, the Finnish elections have ended up on 
the formation of a right-wing coalition with the True Finns party. 
In Sweden however, the center-right parties’ “Alliance for Sweden” led by 
Fredrik Reinfeldt, prime Minister of Sweden since 2006, has chosen to form a minority 
government after the elections of 2010 and has clearly proclaimed its refusal to work 
with the SD and declined any negotiations with them. If the last elections on 14 
September saw the left-wing minority coalition led by the Social Democrats win the 
government, the SD made an historical result of 12.9% and became the 3 biggest parties 
in Sweden overtaking by far the Greens and the Centre Party.  
Is thus Sweden following the path of its Nordic neighbors regarding the rise of radical 
right-wing parties and their political acceptation or does it remain an exception?  
While many scholars have focused their research on explaining the reason of the rise of 
RRWPPs and their persistence, less attention has been given to the supply side and the 
reactions of the mainstream parties towards them.  
While the concept of “pariah party” has often been used in the literature about 
RRWPPs, there is a lack of intelligibility regarding its definition. What is a pariah 
party? When is a party a pariah? To which extent can a party be labeled as pariah party?  
The aim of the thesis, thus, is firstly to give a holistic view on the concept of “pariah 
party” in the academic field but also to analyze the status of the SD in the Swedish party 
system and find out if it fits the features of a pariah party. Based on the literature 
regarding pariah parties, we will study the evolution of the SD in Swedish 
parliamentary politics, the behavior of the mainstreams parties towards it and especially 
the pursuit of an ostracization of the SD on the national level. 
Because of the limits of the thesis, the scope will be reduced to the national level 
and the period from the last Swedish general election of 2010, marking the first entrance 
of the SD in parliament until December 2014. The hypothesis is formulated that in 
Western European politics, most of the parties formerly labeled as “pariah parties” have 
moved towards the mainstream “both in long-term structure and cultural ways and in 
the immediate context of party competition and electoral politics” (M. Mikenberg, 
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2013) and thus, the “pariah party” status should be understood as a stage in the 
RRWPPs development and access to power.  So against the backdrop of many RRWPPs 
having been able to break out of the “pariah party” status, this thesis will look at 
whether the SD has achieved similar conditions for such a change and the extent to 
which mainstream parties are attempting to hold on to the “pariah party” line.  
Four leading questions will be examined over the thesis: (1) To which extent can 
a party be labeled as a pariah party? (2) What are the strategies and arguments used by 
the pariah parties in their search to become more acceptable and play a role in coalition 
formations? (3) To what extent do mainstream parties’ reactions have an impact on the 
“pariah” nature of a party? (4) Which impact does the rise of a “pariah” party have on 
the party system and political process? 
Those questions will be approached qualitatively based on content analysis 
method and through an analysis of the SD’s evolution and strategic changes structurally 
and ideologically, as well as the attitude of the mainstream parties towards the SD in the 
media and in the Riksdag.  
The thesis will be divided into four parts: the first chapter serves as a literature 
review and theoretical foundation to introduce the concept of pariah party and party 
ostracization as well as its analytical limits. The second chapter will introduce the 
methodological framework, research questions and hypotheses used to operationalized 
the analysis. Chapter 3 will be used as a case-introduction chapter to the proper data 
analysis and will provide the reader with information about the SD and Swedish party 
system in order to better outline our case study and understand the major challenges of 
the analysis. The data and empirical results will then be presented and analyzed in 
chapter four and finally chapter five will feature a discussion on the consequences and 
implications of the results as well as the major challenges represented by the last 
Swedish general elections. 
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
This chapter aims at outlining the different theoretical concepts important to this thesis 
and thus presents our theoretical points of departure.  The case study of this thesis being 
the Swedish radical right wing party “Sweden Democrats” and the concept of “pariah 
party”, the whole work will thus focus on those two concepts though a “pariah party” 
can also be a radical party from the left as well. This chapter will thus start with the 
conceptualization of a RRWPP (1.1). From that definition, section 1.2 analyses the 
strategy of political ostracization of a party based on William Downs works, then in 
section 1.3, we will use coalition theories as a theoretical tool to understand the 
conditions under which a RRWPP could become a political partner and participate in 
government formation. In the section 1.4, we will discussed the influence of political 
convergence in the legitimization of a RRWPP and finally, the last section (1.5) will 
provide our conceptualization of a pariah party. 
 
 
1.1. Defining Radical Right Wing Populist Parties 
 
According to many scholars, the SD, which is at the center of our analysis, is a party 
belonging to the “radical right-wing populist” (Betz H-G., 2005), “populist radical 
right”(Mudde C., 2007) or simply “populist right” (Widfeldt A., 2008). The 
denomination is indeed debatable nevertheless we will here prefer the umbrella term of 
“radical right-wing populist party”, which seems to us semantically more relevant and 
adapted to our case study and to some examples from other European countries that we 
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will also regularly use as references. In this part we will thus try to define the main 
characteristics of a RRWPP based on the literature available on the topic. 
 
1.1.1. Populism 
 
Starting from a pure etymological analysis, the core concept of populism is « the 
people », here understood in opposition to the ruling elite of the country and often 
replaced in discourses by the term « ordinary people ». It focuses then on the 
relationship between the people and the elite that it often pictures as imbalanced. 
In this sense, the starting definition of « populism » has been well described by Cas 
Mudde (2004) as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) 
of the people”. As a result, political parties using a populist approach would thus 
explicitly claim to represent the will and interests of the ordinary people in opposition to 
the unrepresentative ruling elites and social institutions, which they often depict as 
oppressive. 
Moreover, populist parties always refer and identify to a “heartland”, a mythical 
or “imagined community” as Anderson (1991) would say, that the parties pretend to 
represent. Nevertheless this “heartland” often remains vaguely defined but mostly 
constructed in a negative manner and often depends on which other ideology the party 
is combined with. 
In their search of representing the ordinary people’s interests, populist parties 
will often use different types of strategy and tools such as a charismatic leader, simple 
and issues oriented discourses as well as a certain type of communication emphasizing 
the idea of direct relations between the party and the people. Paul Taggart gives us a 
very comprehensive review of the main features of populism:  
“Populism is a reaction against the ideas, institutions and practices of representative 
politics which celebrates an implicit or explicit heartland as a response to a sense of 
crisis; however, lacking universal key values, it is chameleonic, taking on attributes of 
its environment, and, in practice, is episodic”(Taggart P., 2000). 
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As Mudde (2004) reminds us, populism is « moralistic rather than 
programmatic » and that is the reason why it can be combined with any different 
ideology and is, in the words of Taggart (1991), “chameleonic”; if it lacks of definition 
when it comes to a positive construction of the “heartland”, populist parties often 
manage to explicitly point out what and who does not belong to their imagined 
community and that is why, in the case of right wing populist parties it is often linked 
with some nationalistic or xenophobic ideologies. 
 
1.1.2. Radical Right Wing Parties: 
 
Delimiting the conceptual and theoretical field of “radical right wing parties” is once 
again not an easy task and remains a highly disputable concept among the scholars. The 
adjectives “extreme” or “radical” have often been used in an interchangeable way and 
even though there exists an important semantic distinction between the two terms, we 
won’t discuss it in this thesis and we will rather chose the term “radical” which seems 
more appropriate for our case study. It is important to underline the fact that the 
literature used to delimit this concept has used both “extremist” and “radical” 
interchangeably. 
First of all, on the left-right dimension, our study focuses on parties that are 
considered to be “right-wing” or at least are classified as such by most scholars and by 
other parties, however those emerging parties have usually challenged the 
unidimensional political spectrum especially on the economical level and on the degree 
of state’s intervention, what is sometimes called “welfare chauvinism”. 
Besides, the term “radical right wing parties” is often used as an umbrella name for a 
group of parties, which actually possesses different ideological variations, which often 
question the conceptualization of a “radical right wing party family”. Based on Kitschelt 
and Carter previous studies, Mikenberg (2013) offers a comprehensive four-groups 
typology of RRWP: (1) autocratic-fascist (usually including racism or xenophobia) (2) 
racist or ethno-centrist, but not fascist (3) populist-authoritarian (organized around a 
strong and charismatic leader and with a diffuse nationalist ideology); and (4) 
religious-fundamentalist versions (in which nationalism merges with religious rigidity). 
	   12	  
Nevertheless, the lines between the different groups are often blurred and the 
contemporary RRWPP have often shown a high capacity to change in their core 
ideology, their core political concern and especially their perception by the public 
opinion, the other parties and the scholars. What they all share is a certain reductive 
vision of the nation or the national community, their seek for homogeneity (which can 
be ethnic, religious, social etc.) and a usually conservative vision of the society and the 
politics. 
Even though most of them could be labeled “anti-immigrant party” as Fennema 
(1997) or Van Spanje and Van der Brug (2007) have rightly justified, and the anti-
immigrant views of those parties remain in most case at the core of those parties’ 
concerns, we thought that it would be too reductive for our conceptualization of pariah 
parties to use such a denomination. Besides, in the context of our thesis, we would 
prefer a less meaningful or at least more general denomination in order to remain as 
objective as possible and not to fall within the process of “political diabolisation” that 
we will analyze later. 
For the purpose of this thesis and to define what we understand by “radical right 
wing populist parties”, we will thus use the definition of Mikenberg (2013): 
“A political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a homogenous nation, a 
romantic and populist ultra-nationalism which is directed against the concept of liberal 
and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and 
universalism”. 
 
 
1.2. Political ostracization 
 
 
As most European countries have seen the development and rise of RRWPPs in the last 
decades, the reaction of the mainstream parties have been different and have changed 
overtime. Nevertheless, in most European countries the RRWPPs had experienced, at 
least at their beginning, a political exclusion giving them thus this status of pariah party. 
Following the model of “alternative strategies for responding to pariah party” 
established by Downs (2001), a political exclusion or what we will call here 
“ostracization”, can take two different forms: ignoring the RRWPP or isolating it. 
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Figure 2: Alternative strategies for responding to a pariah party (Downs, 2001) 
                       
 
 
1.2.1. Ignoring the RRWPP 
 
This strategy also described by Downs as “do nothing strategy” has been employed by 
mainstream parties from the left and right wing in order to decrease the credibility and 
legitimation of the RRWPPs and their political agenda. This boycott of RRWPPs and 
their championed issues seeks to prevent a party to attain media and public attention, 
which are necessary for a political party to stand out; in the case of Sweden, Anders 
Hellström (2012) recently underlined that “the behaviour of the media as a cause of the 
electoral fortunes of the SD in Sweden”. The refusal by mainstream parties to have 
public debate with a RRWPP has also been one tool to diminish a RRWPP’s political 
legitimacy. 
Finally, the mainstream parties can also implement the strategy of the “clean 
hands” by re-directing the public attention on another issue in order to “play down the 
salience of the issues championed by the radical right” (Bale T., Green-Pedersen C., 
Krouwel A., Luther K.R., Sitter N., 2010). One of the main feature of those RRWPPs 
pointed out earlier, being their populist rhetoric, by preventing them from media and 
public attention and ignoring them, the mainstream parties can lower the importance of 
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those parties and their populist views. Nevertheless, this strategy has often shown to be 
successful for a short period of time and if the RRWPP electoral results are increasing, 
this strategy would inevitably fail and the mainstream parties will have to use some 
other tools in order to contain it. 
 
1.2.2. Isolating the RRWPP 
 
When a RRWPP has received enough media attention and even a relevant share of 
votes, the “ignoring” strategy is not sufficient and the mainstream parties have to 
develop other methods in order to contain the RRWPP.  
The most radical strategy that can be used is a legal restriction of the party, which, 
according to Downs (2001), can take three different forms: “outlawing the party 
completely, raising thresholds for representation in electoral laws, and restricting 
voice”. The most striking case has been the legal restriction of the Flemish Bloc in the 
Netherlands, which opposed one of the strongest legal restriction when in 2004, the 
Court of Appeal declared that the party breached the 1981 anti-racism law and the party 
dissolved. This process has been the result of a long politics of containment established 
by the all the Dutch parties represented on the national level through an agreement in 
1989 to establish a strong “cordon sanitaire”. In this case, mainstream parties used legal 
and institutionalized structures in order to diminish and delegitimize (if not abolish) a 
RRWPP, but the result is not always the one expected and such process can also 
reinforce the position of a RRWPP electorate and be seen as not so democratic. Before 
the presidential elections of 2012 in France, Marine Le Pen, leader of the Front National 
(FN), experienced a lot of difficulties to gather the 500 needed signatures from officials 
and mayor in order to become official candidate. She denounced this nomination rule 
has un-democratic and a form of political manipulation, especially because of the 1976 
amendment which stipulated that the list of officials who sign must be made public. 
This reinforced an increasing skepticism towards traditional parties within the public 
opinion and strengthens for a part of the electorate the appeal of the populist agenda. 
 Another less radical alternative to contain a RRWPP would be the formation of a 
broad political “block” between the main parties in order to prevent the RRWPP to gain 
power, it can be by establishing a grand coalition, which also has its own political risk 
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for the parties in the coalition. Most of the time, the tactic used by mainstream parties 
has been, unlike the “ignore them” strategy, to broadly or individually denounce the 
RRWPP as a political threat (anti-democratic, anti-immigration etc.) and to demonize 
the RRWPP through the mean of the media and parties’ political image. The 
demonization process also goes along with a clear stand from the mainstream parties of 
refusing any kind of collaboration or linkage with the RRWPP.  
 
Ostracization can thus broadly be defined by a political strategy used by the 
mainstream parties in order to delegitimize, boycott and demonize a RRWPP in order to 
diminish it, so to say, containing the spread of its populist agenda and prevent it from 
power. Nevertheless the history has shown us than ostracization can also failed 
especially regarding a change in the political game and social context of a country. We 
should also be aware that some RRWPPs have also, at least at some point, ostracized 
themselves voluntarily, keeping their status of protest party and refusing any 
collaboration and compromise with the mainstreams what did the Danish Progress Party 
for a long time. 
 
 
1.3. The “rule of the game”: coalition and partnerships strategies 
 
If we have talked about the issue of ostracization as a response from the mainstream 
parties to the RRWPPs, we should not forget that the reaction is dichotomous (Fennema 
2003) and mainstream parties can also see the RRWPPS as viable partner and chose to 
pursue a strategy of partnership. Those strategic choice, ostracization or partnership, can 
of course evolve and change over time and even though the thesis is focus on the 
ostracization of RRWPPs, it seems however important to have an understanding of the 
opposite reaction. Acknowledging the idea that “parties are not only ideological 
creatures” and electoral ambitions remain one important factor, it seemed reasonable to 
give a quick overview of coalition formation strategies as a tool to understand the 
potential changing position of a mainstream party towards a RRWPP in order to gain 
parliamentary victory. With an increasing electoral performance of RRWPPs, it is not 
un-reasonable to question a potential change of strategy from the mainstream parties in 
order to get more support, especially in a time where traditional parties support 
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decreases. Finally, we will analyze also the different “engagement” strategy that can be 
taken by the mainstream parties. 
 
 
1.3.1. Coalition formation theories 
 
The major theories of coalition formation are based on the claim that there exist some 
“political parties are utility maximisers and they seek to maximise either office or 
policy”(de Lange S. L., 2012). Scholars have thus divided those theories into two types: 
the office-oriented theories and the policy-oriented ones. 
 
Office-oriented theories 
This type of theories has been described as a “winning game”, where the payoffs are 
constant and in this case parties will seek to form the smallest coalition in order to 
maximise their payoffs. If this minimal winning theory postulated by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944), remains quite general and could be apply to a wide range of 
situations, some authors went further in the conceptualisation of the office-oriented 
theory and allowed a more deductive approach, adding that maximising the payoffs is 
not the only factor shaping a minimal winning coalition. In 1970, Leiserson indeed 
postulated that “bargaining factor” is also decisive, with less actors and parties the 
bargaining and negotiations will be facilitated and there is more chance of maintaining 
the coalition in the long run.  
 
Policy oriented theories 
For other authors, the office-oriented theories often overlooked the importance of 
parties’ policies preference and thus the role of the ideological position of the parties. 
In its “minimal connected winning coalition” theory, Axelrod (1970) assumes that a 
coalition will form between actors that are adjacent on a policy scale and can also 
include “unnecessary actors”. That is to say, the main factor of coalition formation is 
based on the policy orientation of its members, allowing less conflict of interests and 
thus maintaining connection in the coalition. 
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De Swann even specified in his “minimal range theory”(1973) version that not only a 
coalition will form based on a policy scale distance but more precisely on ideological 
distance. The coalition should thus minimize as much as possible the ideological 
distance between the two furthest actors. 
 This quick overview of some of the most famous coalition formation theories, 
we can already see that despite a possible “perceptions of ‘democratic responsibility’” 
(Downs 2002), the reaction of mainstream parties towards RRWPPs can also be driven 
by other factors. We agree on the idea that every party has a potential of 
“coalitionability” and on Tim Bale’s (2003) statement that “as much as there is a trade-
off between democratic responsibility and electoral ambition, then the latter is proving 
more powerful than the former”. 
1.3.2. Engaging the RRWPPs 
In his work, which classified the different reactions of mainstreams parties 
towards the RRWPPs, Downs describes two different strategies used to engage them: 
“co-optation” and “collaboration” strategies. 
Co-optation  
This strategy defines by Down (2001) as the “co-optation of the policy positions that 
won the pariah its seats”, is not a direct engagement strategy and is often less obvious 
than the others. In the case of the RRWPPs, it means that the mainstream parties will 
adopt a very close position than the pariah party’s one on its most successful issues such 
as, for instance, the policy position towards immigration. This strategy often pushes 
right-wards the political position of the mainstream parties in order to appeal to a larger 
electorate on the right wing. However, a lot of cases have proved to be very risky, it can 
blurred the lines between the parties and used on the long term might have the opposite 
effect than expected. By repositioning its policy closer to a RRWPP and using the same 
main issues and rhetorical tool, it would only give more legitimacy to the RRWPP and 
its discourse, effect that has been largely diffused in Europe during those last decades 
and which results appeared clearly on most of the recent elections. Finally, it also gives 
the RRWPP and its political agenda more visibility and publicity on the media level, 
which becomes often a very powerful electoral campaign tools. 
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Collaboration 
The most obvious strategy to engage RRWPPs is a direct and opened collaboration 
between them and the mainstream parties. This collaboration can take different forms 
and be applied on different political levels.  
As we saw already regarding coalition formation, the mainstream parties can see in the 
RRWPPs a viable partner for political collaboration which can be expressed first by a 
government coalition as it happened during the last Norwegian general elections 
(November 2013), when the FrP entered the government as part of a right-wing 
minority alliance with the Conservative and supported by the Liberals and the Christian 
People’s Party. 
The other collaboration possibility is to include a RRWPP as a support party for 
a minority government as it has been the case in Denmark since recently between the 
former right-wing governments and the DF. In exchange of its support, the RRWPP can 
obtain the implementation of some of its key demands and in this case the RRWPP can 
no longer be considered as a pariah party. 
 
Legislative coalitions 
The “coordination” between the cabinet parties and the opposition is necessary in the 
case of a minority government; it will thus lead to legislative bargaining between the 
cabinets and the other parties. This system of “contract parliamentarism” (Bale T. and 
Bergman T., 2006) might be on the one hand seen as a more balanced and 
representative system. It indeed implies the fact that in order to pass a law, the cabinet’s 
parties will have to build up some legislative coalitions and enter negotiations with 
some parties of the opposition to get enough votes to pass the policy. The government is 
thus forced to cooperate and compromise on some special issues with the opposition 
and it could thus also boast the will of opposition parties, even the smaller ones, to enter 
legislative coalitions by seeing some opportunities to have greater influence on policy-
making and “get out while the going is good “.  
On the other hand it can also benefit the government and not only regarding a 
purely numerical argument but also because it allows a wider scope of legislative 
coalition opportunities and more flexibility on the term of the agreements than it could 
be with some government coalition partners. Legislative agreements are the result of 
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bargaining between the government and the opposition and the scope and forms of those 
agreements can vary a lot: “Legislative agreements are defined as agreements between 
the government and at least one party not in government on a policy decision. 
Empirically these agreements vary from informal oral agreements to very formal written 
document” (Christiansen F. J., Pedersen H. H., 2014). 
In democracies were minority governments have become regular, those 
agreements tend to become more and more detailed and can be arranged before the 
elections. In Denmark for example, the liberal- conservative governments of Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen (2001-2011) made some legislative agreements with the Danish 
People’s Party and in exchange of its support, the radical right- wing party managed to 
obtain the implementation of some of its key demands and policies on immigration. 
Indeed, the case of Denmark with its highly formalized “package deals” between the 
government and the legislative partners has shown that in order to keep influence on the 
policy-making process and not being completely marginalized, opposition parties would 
be more motivated to enter legislative coalitions. It also showed that through the game 
of legislative bargaining, any kind of party can at some point become a support party 
and thus enter the political game without necessarily entering a formal coalition. 
So if on the one hand, minority governments have formally prevented some 
RRWPPs to enter coalitions, as it was the case in 2010 in Sweden when Alliansen1 won 
the elections and preferred to form a minority government rather than to negotiate a 
coalition with the SD; on the other hand, it still allows those parties to play a strategic 
role in the legislative game and obtain some of their political claims through bargaining, 
as the case of the Danish People’s Party has proved. Moreover, a minority government 
can lead a RRWPP to become a real pivotal party if it has obtained a certain percent of 
votes and even if they remain ostracized by the main parties as coalition partners. 
 
In this part we tried to put into context the potential for collaboration of RRWPPs 
and the way it could be done. Electoral weight appeared of course as one important 
factor explaining the political and strategic weight of RRWPPs, nevertheless it does not 
necessarily prevent them to remain ostracized. . In its research about the FrP accession 
to government in 2013, Anders Jupskås (2014) underlined accurately that electoral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1Alliansen (The Alliance) was the center-right coalition headed by Fredrik Reinfeldt and consisting of the 
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weight but also ideological convergence are the main factors driving this 
rapprochement, a convergence that is often two-way.   
 
1.4. Parties’ political shift 
 
In its researches about the extreme right in France and Australia, Aurélien Mondon 
(2013) underlines two major developments that have to be taken into account in the 
understanding of a pariah party’s persistence and legitimization: “The first is that the 
extreme right has begun to reassess its programme, ideology and rhetoric, and adapt to 
its time and place in order to compete for power. (…) The second is the rightward move 
and even radicalisation of the discourse and politics of the mainstream parties, 
particularly those on the right of the mainstream spectrum”. As we already saw when 
analyzing the different forms of reactions of the mainstream parties, the persistence and 
legitimization of a pariah party in the political arena is challenging the mainstream 
parties strategy and positions, and as Mondon claimed, the legitimization of one 
RRWPP, formerly pariah party, often comes from the convergence of mainstream 
parties and RRWPPs, so to say a mainstreaming of the RRWPPs and the radicalization 
of the mainstream parties.  
 
1.4.1. Political convergence of mainstream parties 
 
Many studies that analyzed the rise of RRWPP concluded that one reason for their 
emergence has been the political convergence of the traditional parties to the center, 
thus creating some “niches” which became the political opportunity for the RRWPP to 
distinguish them on the political scene. In most of his studies about the radical right, 
Herbert Kitschelt uncovered the different political opportunities that have supported the 
emergence of RRWPPs and how they got rid of their pariah status. According to him, 
those parties managed to emerge thanks to the central convergence of mainstream 
parties, thus creating some free “niches” that they have often successfully exploited.  
If indeed a political convergence of the traditional parties to a centric position has been 
often a factor of the emergence of the RRWPP and has, for example, motivated protest 
votes; it cannot alone explain the persistence of RRWPPs and the legitimization of their 
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ideas. In his article Radical Right Populism in Sweden: Still a Failure, But for How 
Long?, Jens Rydgren (2002) justly highlighted the specificity of the Swedish case 
where the theory of Kitschelt can find some limits: in Sweden, the economic cleavages 
and an enduring class loyalty remain pretty important and the degree of convergence 
between the parties (especially the Social Democrats and the Moderates) remains pretty 
low.  
In our analysis of “pariah parties”, Kitschelt’s general idea that "the fortunes and 
behaviour of a political party are dependent not only on the presence or absence of an 
electorate close to its party position, but also on the strategic interactions of political 
parties in the competitive system” (Kitschelt H., 1995) remains relevant. However, in 
order to understand the persistence and legitimization of RRWPP in politics, we should 
rather analyze the convergence of the mainstream parties, especially right-wing ones, 
and the RRWPPs towards each other. 
 
1.4.2. Mainstreaming the radical: 
 
Once they get enough electoral supports to become a “relevant” party, most of the 
pariah parties have to face the question of rather remain in their status of protest party 
risking to lose their position on the electoral scene, ostracized themselves and be only a 
“one-time” event, whether they have to play the political game and try legitimized 
themselves in the eyes of the public opinion and especially in the eyes of the other 
political parties. The strategy adopted by a pariah party to improve its image can take 
very different features from change of party leader, change of party’s name to 
ideological variations. This trend has been recently called in the medias as a “de-
demonization” of a party, especially in the case of the Front National whose change of 
party leader, from Jean-Marie Le Pen to his daughter Marine Le Pen, has gone with a 
change of rhetoric and, it is debatable, some ideological change. One other important 
instrument in the “moderation” of a RRWPP and its strategy to reclaim political 
legitimacy can be the “purge” of the party from the most extreme person, those openly 
supporting revisionist views or source of scandals regarding xenophobic actions etc. 
Even though RRWPP’s key themes remain, as Mudde (2007) calls them, the trinity – 
corruption, immigration, security –; a strategy of “mainstreaming” could also include 
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the “diversification” of key themes and the moderation of their championed issues as it 
has been the case with many RRWPPs shifting to a so-called “welfare chauvinism” or 
their criticism towards “illegal immigrants” more than “immigration” itself. 
Finally, the mainstreaming of a party can also come along with the change in the 
relationships or views towards the traditional parties or so to say the moderation of the 
anti-establishment views, by assuming the possibility of political collaboration with the 
traditional right-wing parties. In the case of Denmark for example, there has been an 
obvious conflict between two tendencies among the populist radical right on the issue of 
mainstreaming at the time of the Danish Progress Party of Morgen Glistrup. Under 
Glistrup’s leadership, the party kept its opposition and protest party position till the 
leadership of Pia Kjaersgaard who tried to lead the party towards more 
institutionalization and collaboration with the right-wing parties (support for budget 
etc.). Nevertheless her politics met numerous opposing voices in the party, which ended 
up in the creation of the splinter party the Danish People’s Party by Kjaersgaard and 
other former members, despite a clearer “radical-right wing” ideology, by accepting to 
support other right-wing parties and collaborate with them, the Danish People’s Party 
became very successful whereas the Danish Progress Party fell out of the polls. 
However, if in the case of Denmark the success of the DF has been helped by its 
mainstreaming and its moderation towards establishment, the main factor for its 
legitimization has been on the other side, the “radicalization” of the mainstream right-
wing parties on issues such as immigration. 
 
1.4.3.  Radicalising the mainstream: 
 
For a long time, the studies on RRWPPs have been influenced by the theory of “Normal 
Pathology” of Scheuch and Klingemann (1967), which considers the values promoted 
by the RRWPs to be unfamiliar and incompatible with those of the mainstream parties. 
In 2010, Case Mudde revised this theory by proposing another perspective on the 
question through its “pathological normalcy” theory:  
“The populist radical right constitutes a radicalization of mainstream views (cf. Betz 
2003; Minkenberg 2001). The empirical argument is that key aspects of the populist 
radical right ideology are shared by the mainstream, both at the elite and mass level, 
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albeit often in a more moderate form”. 
With the electoral success of RRWPPs in Europe, some scholars have shown 
that a lot of right-wing parties have experienced a positional shift to the right after 
having lost some electorates in favor of a RRWPP, or what is also described as “the 
contagion of the right”. Not only those parties have tried to focus on the championed 
issues of the RRWPPs but also they have radicalized their ideologies and sometimes 
even used some of the populist rhetorical tools. 
In a recent article, Aurélien Mondon (2013) indeed analyzed the obvious shift of 
the French right-wing party Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) under the 
leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy towards a focus and more radical views on the questions 
of immigration and security and through a populist rhetoric. In its study of the 
emergence of RRWPPs in Denmark, Rydgren (2007) also assessed that “another 
reason why the immigration issue has come to dominate Danish political and mass 
media discourses since the mid-1990s is that some of the established parties have joined 
the discourse”. As Down underlines it, the “co-option” strategy of mainstream parties 
and their appropriation of the RRWPPs’ issues in order to regain some electorate has 
given more legitimacy to the RRWPPs and their ideas rather than benefiting rather to 
benefit the mainstream parties to give more legitimacy to the RRWPPs and to their 
radical ideas. 
In this party we tried to make the point that the legitimization of a RRWPP, 
which could thus lead to the loss of its “pariah” status, is indeed due to political 
convergence not necessarily towards the center, but between the mainstream right-wing 
parties and a RRWPP. We thus assume that the study of the legitimization (or not) of a 
pariah party should be also done through the analysis of this double convergence. 
 
1.5. The concept of pariah party 
 
The term pariah has been generally used to define a person, according to Webster’s 
dictionary, “who is hated and rejected by other people”. More interestingly, the 
Cambridge online dictionary, adds up to this definition the concept of trust, the pariah is 
rejected “because he or she is not liked, respected or trusted”. In political science also 
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the term has been recently associated to political parties but the literature on the topic 
remains pretty recent and narrow. Some scholars such as McDonnell and Newell (2011) 
have preferred the term “outsider” to describe those kinds of parties, nevertheless for 
the purpose of this thesis we prefer the use of “pariah” because it adds a more negative 
feature to the concept. Semantically we thus consider the term “pariah” as more relevant 
for this thesis than other terms often used as synonym.  
The concept of pariah party has been only recently at the center of some 
academic studies and it seems that William Downs has been the pioneer with its article 
“Pariah in their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Extremist Threats”, 
putting the concept at the center of his study. One factor explaining the lack of literature 
about this concept could be found in the academic shift in the analysis of pariah parties 
such as RRWPPs from a “demands” perspective to a “supply” one, then less focus on 
the reasons why people vote for them but how such parties manage to get supports and 
sometimes become part of political alliances. If most of the scholars working on “pariah 
parties” agree on various features, it is difficult to find a general definition on which 
they all agree and a lot of questions regarding the concept of “pariah party” remain 
unanswered. 
Following some of the broaden definition given by scholars, we will try to be as 
comprehensive as possible in our conceptualization of a “pariah party”. The main and 
broaden question would thus be what is a pariah party? To which extent can a party be 
still labeled as pariah? Is the “pariah” status a stage in the political development of a 
party? 
We can already find in William M. Downs’ work (2013) one of the most detailed 
definition of the concept: 
“In political terms, the pariah party is ostensibly an untouchable, beyond the pale of 
political acceptability. The pariah party is, at least initially, ostracized, demonized and 
rejected as unacceptable by most other actors in the system. 
The pariah is an “anti-“ party in some fashion: anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, anti-
system, anti-capitalist or anti-establishment.  
Pariah parties come in left and right varieties, and they embody a diffuse alienation and 
distrust of the existing political system. While they seek to achieve their goals through 
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conventional channels of electoral contestation, they may have parallel organizational 
structures”. 
 
More generally a party is considered as a pariah when it is labeled as such and 
“demonized” by the mainstream parties as well as the civil society. Even though the 
concept of pariah party goes beyond the left-right dimension and could be apply to 
some parties from the left or from the right wing, for the purpose of this analysis and the 
case of the Nordic countries we will focus on the anti-establishment and populist parties 
from the radical right-wing, which have been the center of much attention during the 
last years, especially considering their growing success.  
As David Art (2007) and Anders Hellström (2012) remind us in their respective articles, 
the role of the media in the process of “demonization” or “de-demonization” of a party 
is very important.  
If most scholars agree on the importance of the role of other parties in the 
“pariah-making” process, there are some slight divergences. For instance, for Van Panje 
and Van der Brug (2007), it is possible to talk about a pariah party and ostracization “if 
it was boycotted and denounced as “anti-democratic” by the main right-wing party” and 
if the right-wing parties are rejecting clearly any cooperation with this party and do not 
start using the same language and rhetorical tools. Those cases are rare though, and the 
history of the Danish Progress Party and its splinter party the Danish People’s Party has 
shown that in order to institutionalize and strengthen its political role, an “anti-
establishment” party has to “play the political game” and to move toward the 
mainstream. Thus a starting assumption would be that a party is considered as a 
“pariah” when it is firstly labeled negatively and perceived salonfähig through the 
media, the public opinion and the political discourses of the traditional parties, and 
secondly, on the political level when the mainstream parties do not consider the party as 
coalitionable nor as an acceptable partner because of the ideas and values it promotes. 
Moreover, as we already talked about, despite some difficulties to clearly place 
some of those parties on a left-right dimension regarding socio-economical issues, they 
remain “right-wing” in their approach to socio-cultural issues, which are the key planks 
of their program. This being set down and our study being focused on the RRWPPs, we 
assume that the reactions of the mainstream right-wing parties towards a RRWPP are 
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the main factor to be looked at. The reaction of traditional socialist and left-wing 
parties, can of course, tells also a lot about the ostracization of a RRWPP, however the 
empirical facts have proved that the European RRWPPs that managed to become 
legitimized political parties in European and especially in the Nordic countries, entered 
or supported right-wing alliances and coalitions on the national level and as we saw 
earlier regarding the “radicalization of the mainstream”, it is the shift from the tradition 
right-wing parties to a more radical right side that has been the main factor of the 
legitimization of RRWPPs and should be analyze in the broaden context of electoral 
game and party competition. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The idea for the thesis’ topic emerged from a personal interest in the debate and when 
starting to investigate the more general topic of RRWP, it appears that most of the 
literature or research on the topic has been focused on the demand perspective and why 
RRWPP have encountered more and more electoral success in Europe.  For this thesis, 
it has been decided to take a different approach to the case of the SD and to analyze it 
from a supply perspective.  Moreover, as it has been mentioned in the theoretical part, 
many different variables should be taken into account in order to determine if the SD 
can be still considered as a pariah party or not, that is the reason why the qualitative 
research method has been favored and the research questions try to cover the different 
variables as every one of them is needed to really assess the pariah party concept. 
 
 2.1. Research questions and hypotheses 
 
The aim of this work is to determine if the SD is what we define as a “pariah 
party”, especially since its entrance into the Riksdag during the last general elections in 
2010, their recent results in the September 2014 elections. I will thus build my research 
in the time frame built around the different events that happened following the 2014 
elections until the end of December 2014.  
In order to build a comprehensive and holistic view on the research topic, here are the 
different research questions that will be asked: 
 
1) To which extent can a party be labeled as a pariah party?  
2) What are the strategies and arguments used by the pariah parties in their 
search to become more acceptable and play a role in coalition formations? 
3) To what extent do mainstream parties’ reactions have an impact on the 
“pariah” nature of a party?  
4) Which impact does the rise of a “pariah” party on the political scene have on 
the party system and political process?  
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The discussion part of this thesis will indeed attempt to figure out if the last 
election results might have definitely propelled the SD out of their pariah status but also 
we will discuss more broadly which impact does the “pariah” parties’ rise on the 
political scene have on the Swedish party system and if its “salonsfähig” status can be 
put into questions for the next elections. 
 
 2.2. Empirical data 
 
The concepts of “pariah party” and “political ostracization” involving different 
parameters and variables, this work will thus used some very different sources of data in 
order to answer the research questions.  
First of all, the official archives of the Riksdag are a very rich source for 
analyzing the role of the SD in parliament since 2010 through their different motions, 
votes and involvement in the work of committees. All those documents can be indeed 
found in the online archives (“Documents and acts”) of the Riksdag at the following 
address: http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/ 
A particular attention will later be given to the election manifesto (valmanifest) 
from the SD for the 2010 and 2014 elections.  
Finally, regarding the reaction of the mainstream parties, because of the limitation of the 
work, we will focus on the analysis of the coalition choices made by the 2010 and 2014 
governments to not include the SD as coalition partners and will based our analysis on 
articles, especially from Swedish national newspapers such as the Svenska Dagbladet, 
Dagens Nyheter and also the English speaking “The Local Sweden” as well as the 
different documents from the SVT (Swedish National Television). 
 Finally, because the case studied is a contemporary actor of Swedish politics, it 
has been decided that this work would focus on the data available until the end of 2014, 
but some few recent data can be still use in the discussion part and the conclusion in 
order to have an overview on how events have evolved since the end of 2014 and on 
their contemporary consequences. 
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 2.3. Methodological approach 
 
In order to explore our topic, the thesis will follow the classical qualitative case study 
approach. According to Yin (2009a, p18) the case study method can be defined as:  
« An empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), set within 
its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident » 
This method has been indeed chosen because it allows the triangulation of data 
and the study of our phenomenon in its context, which we consider as an integral and 
necessary part of the research in order to understand it and capture all its complexity.  
Following Klein and Myers’ (1999) assumption that   “our knowledge of reality is 
gained only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared 
meanings, documents, tools, and other artifacts”, the use of interpretive case study 
method seems more accurate for the purpose of this research. 
For this thesis, we have chosen to use a single-case study method because the 
case selected – the SD and its ostracization – has been considered until nowadays to 
have followed a very different path from its Nordic or European counterparts. A single-
case study can thus allow a more in-depth analysis but an embedded approach will be 
used to our single-case study as the concept of ostracization and “pariah” party 
necessarily involved to analyze also the reaction of other Swedish parties.  
If the main question leading this research is “Can we still consider the SD as a 
pariah party?”,  the case study approach is important because it will help to analyze the 
reasons why it could be label as a pariah party but also to what extent the SD can still be 
labeled as a pariah party. More generally the analysis is also focused on the processes 
by which the SD is trying to get rid of his pariah status along with the importance of the 
election results and their new places in the Swedish political space and in the Riksdag. 
For those reasons, the interpretive single case study method has been considered as the 
best research method to investigate our case especially because of the need of 
triangulation of different sources to better understand the topic and the context in which 
it has evolved. 
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Because of the quite limited literature on the concept of “pariah party”, this 
thesis has also the ambition to propose a more accurate definition of the concept and for 
this reason this case study approach will be more “instrumental”. This case study type is 
used, according by Stake,  “to accomplish something other than understanding a 
particular situation. It provides insight into an issue or helps to refine a theory. The case 
is of secondary interest; it plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of 
something else. The case is often looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its 
ordinary activities detailed, and because it helps the researcher pursue the external 
interest. The case may or may not be seen as typical of other cases”.  
 
 2.4. Problems with the research design 
 
This work should be seen as a preliminary research on the SD change of status and role 
in Swedish politics, but the author acknowledges the fact that further and deeper 
research should be done on the topic including all the relevant variables linked to the 
concept of pariah parties. Nevertheless, the aim of this work is mainly to put into 
question the status pariah party associated with the SD and to provide an insight into 
how and why a pariah party can be able to enter the political game and maybe become 
acceptable even in a long-lasting party system model such as the Swedish one. Here are 
thus the different limits acknowledged by the author that should be taken into account 
while reading this work. 
First of all, as we will see with the theoretical conceptualization of “pariah 
party”, this thesis has focused on certain key aspects of the concepts. Because of the 
length restriction of the thesis, it has been decided to focus first of all only on the 
national and parliamentary level, which means we decided to analyze the overall status 
of the party, it is nevertheless important to notice that on the local level, this status 
might have already been overtaken and the SD might have already become a “normal” 
party on some localities political scene: “In the national election of 2006, the party 
received 2,93 per cent of the votes (…) however, it claimed 16 county councils seats 
and 281 municipal seats the same year, in some municipalities reaching more than 20 
per cent of the votes” (Dandoy R. and Schakel A., 2013). 
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Secondly, as we will see in our conceptualization of “pariah party”, it would 
have also been very interesting to analyze more deeply the evolution of the SD on a 
pure marketing-based analysis: from the “neo-Nazi” to the “social conservatives” 
denomination (as they call themselves), their de-demonization effort or victimization- 
but for this limited work, we preferred to focus on the more political aspect of the 
ostracization process. 
Finally, it is important to specify that most of the data could be accessed only in 
Swedish; the author has thus done herself translations of most of the quotes of the data 
analysis chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: OUTLINING THE CASE 
 
In order to better understand the issues analyzed in this work and their consequences, 
the choice has been made to write a separate chapter to outline the case. It seems indeed 
necessary for a reader not familiar with Swedish politics to get an overview of the 
Swedish party system functioning and also of the SD party and its origins, before 
proceeding to the empirical part of this work. 
 
3.1. The Swedish Political Model and Party System 
 
3.1.1. General Information 
 
Sweden is a parliamentary monarchy with a unicameral legislative branch, the Riksdag, 
composed of 349 elected members. The executive power is represented by the 
Government and it consists of a Prime minister and around 20 ministers appointed by 
him. The Prime minister himself is appointed by the Speaker of the parliament and 
appointed following a vote in the parliament.The Prime Minisiter has traditionally been 
the leader of the biggest party in the government but can be remove with its Cabinet 
following a vote of confidence: 
“The Government must enjoy the support of, or at any rate be tolerated by the Riksdag, 
otherwise it may be forced to resign. Whenever it wants, the Riksdag is free to hold a 
vote of confidence to see whether the Government still enjoys the Riksdag’s support” 
(Sveriges Riksdag, The Riksdag in Swedish Society). 
The legislative power is represented by the 349 MPs of the parliament and in 
order to facilitate the decision-making process, the decisions are prepared in the 15 
parliamentary committees: “Each committee is responsible for policy areas: issues 
relating to defence are for example assigned to the Committee on Defence, while 
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healthcare issues are dealt with by the Committee on Health and Welfare” (Sveriges 
Riksdag, How the Riksdag works). Each committee consists of 17 MPs divided up 
between the different parties according to their strengths in the parliament. 
3.1.2. Swedish party system 
 
The Swedish party system can be actually described through the concept of 
Scandinavian party system model from which it has kept most of the main features. 
According to H. Bergström (1991), the Scandinavian party system model can be 
considered as “the simplest in any of the democracies” and is based on Berglund and 
Lindström’s five-party Scandinavian model (1978). We can retrace the historic period 
of party building in Scandinavia between the 1880s and the 1920s, process which had 
been influenced by different historical events that Rokkan and Lipset (1967) classified 
as 4 formative revolutions:  the early Religious revolution or protestant Reformation, 
the National revolution, the Industrial revolution and the Proletarian revolution. Those 
different events indeed had a strong impact on the molding of the Scandinavian parties 
and the model of the 2+3 party system model: 2 socialist parties (usually communist 
and social democrats) and 3 non-socialist ones (usually Agrarians, Liberal and 
Conservative). What make the Scandinavian party system very special are also its 
unidimensiality, the lasting strength of the social democrats, the relative strength of 
agrarian parties and the strong political cohesion of social groups. The beginning of the 
1970s represents a political turning point in party politics and 4 new party families 
emerged: eco-socialist parties, Green parties, new Christian parties and populist 
entrepreneur parties.  
What makes the Swedish party system very peculiar is that since the World War 
II, even though they are losing some electorate, the main traditional political parties still 
register some high scores especially in comparison with other European traditional 
parties: “more than three in five Danes, Finns and Norwegians and almost three in four 
Swedes have backed one of the three pole parties over the period since the Second 
World War testifies to the resilience and durability of the core electoral parties in post-
war Scandinavia” (Arter D., 2011). 
This system has thus very slowly and not often gotten an important place for new 
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parties to emerge and for a very long time the Social Democrats had been the main 
party of the country. Nevertheless, the last decades have seen the emergence of minority 
government in Sweden, which has pushed the parties to change their practices and seek 
for different forms of support. 
3.2. The Sweden Democrats 
 
3.2.1. The Sweden Democrats, an “anomaly” in the Swedish political space? 
 
If in 1991, the party New Democracy (ND) – a RRWPP on the model of the Norwegian 
Progress Party- managed to enter the Riksdag. ND’s experience did not last long as the 
party did not manage to remain in parliament after the 1994 general elections and 
eventually was dissolved in 2000. The experience was thus short and did not have much 
influence on the Swedish political landscape so unlike its neighbors; Swedish political 
landscape has been historically quite preserved of the presence of RRWPPs. 
Nevertheless, in September 2010, the SD constituted a surprise and entered for 
the first time the parliament by reaching 5.7 % of the votes, in a party system 
historically dominated by the traditional two socialist parties and three non-socialist 
ones (2+3 party system model). Whereas the party has been most of the time called 
“right extremists”,  “radical right-wing” or “anti-immigration” party, the SD defines 
itself as a “social conservative” (Sverige Demokraternas principprogram, 2011) party: 
“We are the Swedish-friendly alternative. We care for the work of the older generations 
and look after what will be soon passed down to the next one. We are the party of 
Sweden as a whole and we believe in change forward” (Sverige Demokraterna, Vårt 
Parti).  
If the SD has been usually placed on the radical right fringe of the Swedish 
political scale, it should be mentioned that regarding certain issues such as economy, the 
SD is politically more left-wing than any parties of the mainstream right-wing parties, it 
is also a strong supporter of the welfare state and the mythic “Swedish Social 
Democracy”, but of course it also has some strong conservative and nationalist views 
and can be also described as an anti-immigration party which has had for influence to 
blur the lines between the usual left-right political cleavage and has been one of their 
strength.  
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3.2.2. The SD “from a party of “skin-head” to a party of older bald-headed 
men” (Hellström and Nilsson, 2010)? 
 
The SD is a young party, which was formed in 1988 as the successor of the Party of 
Sweden (Sverigepartiet), a nationalist party which was itself the merger of the Swedish 
populist progress party (Framstegspartiet, FrP) and Keep Sweden Swedish (Bevara 
Sverige Svenskt) an ultra-nationalist party.  
If the SD can not be considered as a neo-Nazi party, it is nevertheless important to 
notice that it took obviously its root in Swedish fascism and, at least at its beginning, the 
party had very close affiliations to a network of white supremacy movements, neo-Nazi 
fringes and Nazi parties all over Europe. Because of those close tights to those radical 
movements, the SD did not manage at the beginning of the 90s to get electoral success, 
especially on the national level where they never scored more than 1% until the 2006 
elections. 
Despite some difficulties on the national level representation, the SD was gaining 
relative success, step by step, on the local level. It is really in the mid-90s that the party 
started to polish its image in order to enter the political game and to gain greater 
influence, thanks to its new leader Mikael Jansson, who, unlike the previous SD leaders 
had no connections with radical movements and as a former member of the Centre 
Party, was a politically more moderate person. Jansson started to change the image of 
the party to make it look like a more respectable and less radical one, at least by all 
appearances. If the party distanced itself from radical racist movements, it remained 
very close to radical right wing movements all over Europe and got support from other 
rising RRWPPs such as the French National Front, the Freedom Party in Austria or the 
Danish People’s Party among the closest ones.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3. The SD in the Riksdag 
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Finally, under the influence of its new charismatic leader Jimmy Åkesson, the SD 
managed to reach 2.9% of votes in the 2006 national elections, a success that has 
doubled 4 years later and allowed the SD to enter the Riksdag on the 19th September 
2010 with 5.7 % and received 20 seats, one more than for the Left Party or the Christian 
Democratic Party, which both scored only 5.6% (European Election Database, Sweden 
parliamentary elections 2010). If Swedish politics has been shaken by this result and 
despite the rising attention given to the SD, this result had first been broadly compared 
to the 1991 New Democracy experience, and it was difficult to imagine at that moment 
that the SD would become, 4 years later, the third biggest party in Sweden. And indeed, 
on the 14th September 2014, the SD became the third Swedish party at the general 
elections, with 12.9% of the votes (49 seats) and beating up by far the other parties such 
as the Greens, the Centre Party, the Left Party or the Christian Democrats. By becoming 
the 3 biggest parties in Sweden, the SD also received one of the 3 the vice deputy 
speaker positions of the parliament, a very symbolic event which has also been seen as a 
political chock and proves the rising importance of the SD on the political scene. 
If the SD scored pretty high, the Social Democrats and the Moderates, the 
historically two biggest parties, had difficulties to maintain their scores. Eventually, the 
Social Democrats, which got the highest score with 30.7% of the votes (112 seats) 
decided to build a minority government in coalition with the Greens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Results of the SD at national elections since its creation: 
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Election year 
 
Results (%) 
 
Number of seats in the 
Riksdag  
1988 0.0 0 
1991 0.1 0 
1994 0.2 0 
1998 0.4 0 
2002 1.4 0 
2006 2.9 0 
2010 5.7 20 
2014 12.9 49 
Sources: Dahlstrom, C. ; Esaiasson, P. (2013) and European Election Database 
 
By challenging the left-right cleavage of Swedish politics, the SD is thus trying to look 
for cooperation and coalition within the biggest parties, from the left or from the right. 
Nevertheless the SD has not been asked yet to be part in a coalition, neither under the 
last center-right government, nor under the new center-left one, but its involvement in 
Swedish politics and its success might change the perception of the SD by the other 
parties and also change his role in Swedish politics as we will try to analyze in this 
work. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
At the initial step of retrieving empirical data, different sources have been selected and 
have been processed altogether in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the 
different variables’ analysis and to answer the different research questions of this work. 
 
4.1. The SD on the path of normalization and moderation? 
 
As we quickly explained in the introduction, the SD is a young party, which 
encountered numerous changes as much ideological as structural in order to 
institutionalized and fit better in the party system. Like most of the successful European 
RRWPPs, the SD has tried, in order to appeal more voters, to distance itself from the 
anti-democratic and radical image it was spreading at the beginning. Nevertheless, it is 
important to notice that in comparison with its Nordic counterparts, the SD has been 
more complicated to classify in the political landscape and its particular ideology has 
raised many issues on the theoretical level as well as on the practical one. Those 
peculiarities that we will analyze in the coming sub-chapter can explain some of the 
reasons of its success within voters as well as some of the failures of the party to get 
accepted by the other parties on the national and on the European one. 
 
 4.1.1. A “social-conservative party with a nationalist foundation” 
 
In 2011, a bit more than one year after its entrance in the Riksdag, the SD adopted a 
new “Principe program” and following the proposal from the party chairman Jimmie 
Åkesson, the party members decided to re-define the party as a “social-conservative 
party”, which was even refined by Åkesson as “a social conservative party with a 
nationalist ideology, and considers value conservatism and the maintenance of a 
solidary welfare as the most important tools for the good society”. This new ideology 
title has been one of the many attempts to change the radical and xenophobic image of 
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the party among the Swedish electorates but also among the other parties. 
 On the one hand it is arguable that this definition fits quite well the ideology of 
the party since 2010 and manage to combine what makes the party difficult to classify: 
its central-left position on the socioeconomic dimension and its 
conservative/authoritarian one on the value-based dimension:  
 
Figure 3: Party Positions in two dimensions: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 
 
 
 Unlike the other Nordic RRWPPs such as the Danish People Party and the 
Norwegian Progress Party, the SD ideology has managed to promote the legacy of the 
social democracy and Nordic model in the current ethno-nationalist discourses, what 
Hellström and Wennerhag (2013) analyzed in their article National myth making and 
populist mobilization in Scandinavia: “In term of re-appropriation of the Social 
Democratic heritage, the SD stands out as the party most explicitly linking myths of 
national belonging to the ’old’ Social Democracy”. 
 The concept of the “People’s Home” (Folkhemmet in Swedish) first mentioned by 
Rudolf Kjellèn (1916) and later made famous by Per Albin Hansson (1928) -the so 
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called father of the Swedish Social Democracy- has been one of the most important 
pillar of the Swedish nation building and remains a very important part of the Swedish 
national identity. The image of Sweden and Swedish people as a big family, had been 
the basis of the Swedish welfare system and mostly promoted by the Social Democrats 
from the 1930’s as an ideology of solidarity, class collaboration, democracy and 
citizenship: 
 
“Our Swedish people is essentially democratic. It loves freedom and hates oppression 
... it is with every reason that we Swedes are proud of our country. It is a country where 
democracy is rooted not merely in the constitution, but also in our traditions and in the 
disposition of the folk”2. 
 
 If this image became the most spread one, it is important to recall that the early 
“Folkhemmet” concept, presented by Kjellèn, himself a conservative politics, was no 
more than a form of national socialism, mixing conservative values with social reforms 
in order to bring the people together and form a stable and united nation. Even in the 
speeches of Hansson, nationalism and Sweden’s pride remain pretty important and 
contained a civic as well as a communitarian vision of the society. 
As already mentioned, the SD took its roots in Swedish fascism, the ethno-centrist 
ideology evolved during the 1990s and already in the 2010 party manifesto (Sverige 
Demokraterna, Party Manifesto 2010), it became obvious that the focus of the party 
ideology has been given to the promotion of the traditional Social Democracy with a 
strong focus on the Swedish culture, nativism and national cohesion:	  
 
“ In our Sweden citizens will feel a cultural affinity and therefore a natural trust in 
other citizens (...) In our Sweden freedom and openness are primordial. In our Sweden 
we defend the Swedish cultural heritage, a welfare state built on a common set of values 
and the Swedes’ rights to develop their culture on its own terms. In our Sweden, we help 
people in need, but the Swedish welfare and the country’s well-being come first.” 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Per Albin Hansson, Folkhemstalet, Tal vid andra kammarens remissdebatt (1928) ; transcription found 
in the article of the Göteborg Posten Sommarserie del 3 : Per Albin och Folkhemmet, 
http://www.gp.se/nyheter/ledare/1.960-sommarserie-del-3-per-albin-och-folkhemmet 
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The 2014 manifesto3 went even further in the parallel with the traditional Swedish 
Social Democracy concept and really insisted on it as the title of the manifest on the 
front page already highlights - “WE CHOOSE WELFARE!” . 
It is also very interesting to see some great similarities between the expressions and 
images used in Per Albin Hansson speeches and in this manifesto. 
 
• P. A. Hansson: “for good reason, we Swedes are proud of our country. It is a 
beautiful and good country. It is a country with liberty for the people and 
popular self-government with democracy anchored not only in the constitution, 
but likewise in our traditions and disposition” 
 
• SD 2010 manifesto: “We are proud of our country and our welfare (...) Sweden is 
still a beautiful and fantastic country on many levels”  
 
Even if social democratic values seem to be anchored in the SD ideology it has to 
understand through the light of nationalism and conservatism. 
 
4.1.2. Analysis of the party manifestos of 2010 and 2014: towards 
institutionalization and less radicalism? 
 
In order to find if the SD has started the institutionalization and moderation process, it is 
important to analyze the use of certain ‘key words”, their recurrence, as well as the form 
of the manifestos. Although this analysis would remain quite general, it will provide a 
good overview of the evolution of the party manifestos between 2010 and 2014. 
 
Form of the manifestos 
Communication and marketing has been one of the most crucial point for many 
RRWPPs and the form of a manifesto can tell also a lot about the strategy of a party to 
get rid of its pariah image. In the case of the SD, we can already notice an important 
evolution through the form of the manifesto. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  SD 2014 party manifesto, from the official webpage of the SD: 
http://sverigedemokraterna.se/valmanifest/	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On the one hand we have the 2010 manifesto “99 propositions to improve Sweden”, 
which title bears a pretty populist stance, through which it is implied that the party 
knows exactly what are the solutions to improve the situation of the country and they 
would be even listed in the manifesto point after point. On the other hand, with the title 
“We choose welfare! Sweden Democrats manifesto - 2014 elections”, the 2014 
manifesto flaunts the attachment of the party to the traditional “welfare system” and 
once again blurs the lines of its political space. 
 Then looking at the form of the documents themselves, we notice first of all that 
the 2010 manifesto with about 1800 words is three times shorter than the 2014 
manifesto (about 5500 words). This is a significant change, while the 2010 manifesto 
was still looking like a populist protest-party manifesto with pretty simple and 
comprehensive propositions but lacking at the same time of content and proper 
knowledge on the economic issues, the 2014 one looks more like other mainstream 
party manifesto with different categories, propositions and explanations. 
One last small but interesting detail regarding the evolution of the manifesto’s form is 
the pictures, absent in the 2010 manifesto but illustrate almost every pages the 2014 
manifesto: they are still pretty “nationalist-orientated” and clichés with white and blond 
people, red wooden houses, Swedish flag and traditional Swedish dishes; and thus serve 
one more time the strong nationalist orientation of the party. 
 
Manifesto 2010/2014: towards moderation? 
According to the Comparative Manifesto Project, a project created to record and 
analyze the contents of the election manifestos, it is possible to classify certain words or 
expressions according to the left/right dimension. Without entering details, it was 
nevertheless interesting to compare the two manifestos by looking at the occurrence of 
some of those key words.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: left/right dimension of words according to the CMP 
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source : Comparative Manifesto Project 
 
The differences between the two manifestos regarding those key words are not so high; 
nevertheless we notice a slight decline in the use of these words in the 2014 manifesto.   
 
Figure 5: analysis of key words in the SD manifestos of 2010 and 2014 
 Valmanifest 2010 
occurences of words in % 
(and number) 
Valmanifest 2014 
occurences of stopwords in % 
(and number) 
SECURITY 0.5% (10)  0.4% (23) 
WELFARE 0.25% (5) 0.21% (12) 
DEMOKRATI 0.15% (3) 0.09% (5) 
(cultural/Swedish) 
HERITAGE 
0.25% (5) 0.14% (8) 
CULTURE 0.50% (10) 0.45% (25) 
NATION 0.25% (5) 0.11% (6) 
IMMIGRATION 0.25% (5) 0.22% (12) 
FAMILY 0.15% (3) 0.11% (6)  
FREEDOM 0.10% (2) 0.05% (3) 
RESPECT 0.20% (4) 0.14% (8) 
CRIME 0.30% (6) 0.27% (15) 
Sources: Sverige Demokraterna Party Manifesto 2010 and Party Manifesto 2014 
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 On the content itself it appears that most of the topics covered in the 2010 
manifesto are re-used in the 2014 one and only a bit deepened. We can find the usual 
categories - safety / health  / unemployment / work / education / environment / Europe / 
defense - prioritized in most of party manifestos but also some new ones (compared to 
the 2010 ones) and some very specific to the SD. 
 On the welfare value, the 2014 manifesto insisted more on the democratic stance 
of the party and their openness: “increased support for unemployed”, “A good, fair and 
accessible health care”, “A realistic and sustainable environmental and energy 
policy”, “A politics of strengthening support to vulnerable groups”, “Infrastructure for 
more homes, better growth and a cohesive Sweden”, “A gender policy for the real 
people”, “A living countryside and an animal-friendly society”. 
On the other hand, some traditional radical right-wing and/or authoritarian key themes 
are still present:  
- “A close European cooperation without the supranational”: as most of the RRPs in 
Europe, the SD is euro-skeptic and despite the use of moderate expressions such as 
“European cooperation” or “common European culture heritage”, they still focus on 
the necessity to distance from the EU in order for Sweden to become more independent 
politically, economically and culturally.  
- “A wide, Swedish and accessible cultural life”: in this party the SD is deepening their 
long-living idea of the Swedish cultural canon and the importance of Swedish cultural 
heritage and its defense by opposition to multiculturalism. 
- “Sweden is worth defending!”: on the more authoritarian dimension, the SD are 
preaching for a bigger and stronger national army (re-introduction of obligatory 
conscription) in order to protect Sweden and to make it independent. 
- “A safe, Swedish and knowledge-oriented school”: this might be one of the point 
where the ethno-nationalist views of the party are best represented with the 
immigration one. Sweden has 5 official minority languages and since 2010, a new Act 
on National Minorities and National Minority Languages has strengthened the 
protection and promotion of National Minorities culture and languages, giving them 
also the rights to influence and access political issues, education in the minority 
language etc.  As a nationalist party, the SD is rigorously against this act and the 
promotion of any kind of minorities or minority languages, seeing multiculturalism 
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and multilingualism as a threat to national cohesion and welfare. 
- “An immigration policy that promotes unity and welfare”: despite a title which tries to 
look more moderate with the reference to welfare, the SD has not changed his view on 
immigration by promoting a more restricting immigration policies and assimilation 
politics instead of integration. But on the contrary of some RRPs speech about 
immigration, the SD is trying to moderate their own by using double standard: on the 
one hand Sweden is ready and opened to “help so many needy people in the world as 
possible” but on the other hand, re-affirming that national interests and Swedish 
national identity, national cohesion and welfare remain the priorities: “immigration is 
an asset and not a burden on society”. 
-  
 Just looking through the first page of the 2014 manifesto, it appears clearly that 
the SD remains a populist party with its references to the “heartland” - “ Sweden is in 
many ways unique, and we have our own distinctive culture and history” - but also their 
skepticism towards institutions and other politics - “Unfortunately, we are 
experiencing, however, that over the past decades the governing politicians, through 
their division policies and wrong priorities, have made Sweden a bit less fancy and a 
little less amazing years after years”- and present themselves as the voice of the normal 
people who truly care about their country and their  fellow citizens on the contrary of 
the other politicians : “we love Sweden and the people who live here. For real.”. This 
first page is the one of the ultimate proof that despite some changes, the SD remains a 
very populist and nationalistic party, especially with the image of the perfect country of 
Sweden which has deteriorated because of bad governance, and the use of a wide lexical 
field of the emotions: “ it makes us sad, worried and anxious” , “we love Sweden”, 
“we are proud”, “we feel respect”, “we are grateful”, “we are happy” etc. 
 
 Finally, despite some important changes in the form of the manifestos or the effort 
to deepen their arguments and projects we could argue that the SD manifesto is moving 
towards a more normalized form and is looking less radical than the previous ones. 
Nevertheless they remain very focalized on the same issue - country’s cohesion through 
promotion and protection of the Swedish cultural heritage and restricted immigration 
policy – the same single-issue seen negatively by the other parties, and thus highly 
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contributing to its pariah label.  
 
 4.1.3. Intra-party dynamic 
 
An another important indicator of the institutionalization of a party is its degree and its 
form of internal organization: “To be able to fulfill representative functions, to govern 
and to act as channels or intermediaries between the state and the society, political 
parties need to organize themselves” 
 
 Internal organization 
According to many theories, RRWPPs are expected to have a pretty hierarchical and 
linear (top-down) form of organization with in most of the case one individual at the 
head of the party, with a certain personality and charisma; what is also underlined by K. 
M. Johansson (2014) in his study of RRWPPs internal organization: 
 
“These parties are expected to have light or small organization, simple structure with 
few intermediating constraints on leadership, high level of centralization and 
dominance of the party leader and of the party in central office. Forming around a 
charismatic personality, populist parties may even be without a proper party 
organizational structure extending beyond the central office”. 
 
 For Johansson the SD might be considered as an exception in the landscape of 
European RRWPPs as according to him, there is no charismatic leader at the head of the 
party. If it is true that the SD’s organization might differ from other RRWPPs in the 
way that it has firstly counted on local and regional organizations, we do not entirely 
agree with him regarding the role of the leader. Jimmie Åkesson, the official leader of 
the SD (right now in sick-leave but still officially leader), might not correspond to the 
traditional “charismatic leader” that we could see in other RRWPPs and as we can see 
currently with his sick leave, the party manages to survive without him. Nevertheless, it 
is Jimmie Åkesson, which has mostly helped the party to get where it is now and 
manages also to change its image. Åkesson was actually a member of the Moderates till 
the 1990’s, so choosing him as a leader can firstly give the appearance of a moderation 
of the party. Then he really worked a lot on the marketing image of the party, changing 
	   47	  
symbols, vocabulary and also with its own image: a young, “normal” Swede who likes 
football, BBQs, his family and his country (Sverige Demokraterna, Jimmie). So behind 
an image of a simple leader, we could also see the whole populist machinery and 
marketing of the SD to show Swedes that the SD is like them. And despite what could 
be seen as a lack of charisma, Åkesson has managed to get the image of the needed 
leader and his convalescence has scrambled the party and in every meeting we can see 
banderols with “Jimmie, come back!”. 
 If earlier, the lack of organization of the SD was one of its biggest problems, the 
new leadership with Åkesson at his head has since the 2005 also focused on 
centralization of the authority and develop an effective party organization, on the local 
and regional level as well as on the central level. Thanks to electoral success, finances 
have also improved and the party has thus been able to engage in strengthening its 
organizational and communication strategies. 
 Finally the new leadership of Åkesson and the so called “Scania gang” (Jimmie 
Åkesson , Björn Söder, Mattias Karlsson and Richard Jomshof) have tried since 2005, 
to normalize the party apparatus and has managed to strengthened the leadership as well 
as the organization of the party on every level. According to Johansson, “the SD can be 
regarded as a centralized party” and the internal organization changes that occurred 
during the last decades have tended to institutionalized the party and make it look more 
able to govern. 
 
Elimination of the most radical fringe of the party 
One can also be one of the most important evolution of the party towards moderation 
and institutionalization is the important “purges” that have been going on since 2005 
and that have tried to get rid of the most extremist fringes of the party. If the SD is the 
successor of the Swedish party, known for its very conservative and xenophobic views, 
it has tried to distance itself from this image and to “de-demonize” itself, especially 
since the leadership of Åkesson, himself former member of the Moderate Party. 
 In the recent years, the party has indeed suffered from several scandals, which 
have pushed the leadership to take clear and strong stances towards the members 
involved. Year 2012 has been especially a crucial year for the SD, which had to deal 
with the misdemeanor of several members and representatives of the party. After the 
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scandal and eviction of a local SD politician from Halland who posted anti-Semitic and 
xenophobic words on his personal webpage, Jimmie Åkesson wrote an open letter to the 
party where he stated that “for now on, the zero-tolerance (abr towards racism) and the 
efforts to cleanup the party have become the highest priority” (SvT Nyheter, Åkesson 
städar upp i SD, 2012). 
He openly and officially warned every representatives of the party that any misconduct 
regarding this zero-tolerance would irremediably lead to the eviction of the party. 
 Few weeks after it, a new scandal actually blew up, the so called “Iron pipe 
scandal” when some videos recorded in 2010 were released by the newspaper 
Expressen showing 3 of the 20 SD members of parliament, Kent Ekeroth, Erik 
Almqvist and Christian Westling threatening physically and verbally some people with 
very racist and sexist words. While Almqvist was forced to step down after the scandal 
and finally quit its seat and the party, Ekeroth remained in parliament despite his time-
out. And again, few months after that, it was the turn of another MP, Lars Isovaara to 
resign from its seat after the police reported him for racist abuse and he put together and 
lied about his own aggression by some immigrants. 
 Despite the “zero-tolerance” politics of the party, we can retrace many small 
scandals related to members and local representatives of the SD having been accused of 
xenophobic and racist words or being active in some radical groupuscules. Moreover, in 
February 2015, the Dagens Nyheter Daily reported that Erik Almqvist -whose eviction 
has been waved as the model of the “zero-tolerance” policy of the party- has kept a 
leading role in the Sweden Democrats (SD) media project Samtiden, information which 
was confirmed by the MP Martin Kinnunen, also chairman of the newspaper. Last 
January, the “acting” SD leader Mattias Karlsson who has replaced Jimmie Åkesson 
during his sick leave, himself sparked off a scandal when he declared that although 
Nazism is “terrible”, Islamism is “perhaps greater than from Nazism today” (SvT 
Nyheter, Mattias Karlsson: Islamism större hot än Nazism idag, 2015), especially when 
knowing the roots of the party he is representing.  
 Although the SD has officially adopted a zero-tolerance policy and tried to get rid 
of the most extremist part of its party, the task proved to be more complicated than 
expected and questions also the will and the motivations behind it. With many local 
scandals related to SD representatives regarding xenophobia, it seems that the party is 
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still linked with some radical ideologies and radical members, who still remain an 
important electoral support for the party. 
 
 To conclude this analysis, we can thus confirm that the SD is trying to 
institutionalize and moderate its image in order at the same time to legitimize itself as a 
proper party and also to look more moderate at the eyes of the public and the other 
parties. 
Nevertheless it seems that this normalization and moderation is still in the process and 
the SD is still keeping some of the features of a radical and populist party and in this 
sense might still be considered not moderate and institutionalized enough to distanced 
itself from the pariah status. 
 
 
4.2. Reaction of the mainstream parties 
 
 4.2.1. Ignoring and stigmatizing the SD:  
Since the SD appeared on the political scene, its presence on the political landscape and 
in the media has been quite weak, even when the party started to get more and more 
votes and also despite its breakthrough the Riksdag in September 2010. It is thus quite 
obvious that the party has been for a long time ostracized by the different other actors 
and through different manners. 
 
Ostracization by the mainstream parties 
From its first apparition on the political scene, the SD has been ostracized from the 
other parties. At the beginning indeed, the SD was considered as a new kind of “New 
Democracy” experience, and was seen as another short-lived breakthrough.  
All the mainstream parties adopted pretty much an “ignoring” strategy at the beginning, 
but in 2010, when they eventually entered the Riksdag, the attitude of the other parties 
started to change. 
 First of all, every parties stated before the elections and afterwards that they 
would not enter any form of cooperation with the SD, which means no coalition or no 
“agreement” which would make the SD a support party. In 2010, the Alliance for 
Sweden, managed to build a minority government and though the SD was expecting at 
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least to be called by the Alliance for negotiations, Fredrik Reinfeldt, the leader of the M 
and then Prime Minister clearly re-assess its refusal to have any form of discussion or 
negotiation with them; even if it meant for the Alliance to rule as a minority 
government. As for the mainstream parties from the left wing have been also pretty 
clear that any kind of cooperation with the SD would not be possible. It has thus 
become very clear that all the mainstream parties of Sweden have then tried to prevent 
the SD to have any influence in the Riksdag, especially through two main events. 
 First of all, following the elections, the 7 other parties discussed the possibility of 
decreasing the number of members in the different Riksdag committees from 17 to 15, 
which would thus prevent the SD to enter most of the committees as “Each 
parliamentary committee is made up of 17 members of the Riksdag. Their composition 
reflects the relative party strengths in the Riksdag. The largest party in the Riksdag also 
has the most members in each committee” (Sveriges Riksdag, How the Riksdag Works, 
Committees). The idea was nevertheless abandoned, as it was too controversial. It raised 
many criticisms from different party members regarding the “undemocratic” dimension 
of it and the question of whether or not it would help to prevent the SD to gain influence 
and not on the contrary contribute to its “martyr” image. 
 The second event happened in 2011 when Reinfeldt’s government and the Greens 
made a historical agreement. In order to block the SD to have any influence on its single 
issue – immigration- the Alliance managed to pass a legislative agreement with the 
Greens, pro-immigration party, to ensure majority when voting on immigration issues. 
Finally, despite the growth of the SD in the opinion polls, all the parties categorically 
refuse to engage in any public debate with them especially regarding immigration and 
when mentioning the SD, they kept on calling them “racists”, “neo-fascists”, “right-
extremists” etc. So from the beginning, the SD was considered as a pariah by the 
mainstream parties in their whole. As they imagined that the SD would not last long on 
the political scene, they started to ignore the party, but as we saw in 2011, this strategy 
started to evolve towards a more isolating one. 
 
 
 
Ostracization by the media 
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In the case of the SD’s ostracization, it is also worth to look at their boycott by the 
Swedish media regarding the fact that, media are very important in political process, 
especially during election campaigns. Considering medias as an important tool during 
elections, it seems still accurate to mention their reaction in connection with the 
political ostracization of the SD. 
The treatment of the SD by the medias in Sweden has been indeed very different than 
for the other parties and can be described as a boycott: -­‐ Difficulties to make advertisement: the newspaper Expressen for instance openly 
banned the SD’s from advertisement. -­‐ Non diffusion of SD’s party video on airtime -­‐ Difficulties to enter debate pages -­‐ Negative labeling 
 
It has been admitted that the treatment of the SD in the medias has not been fair 
regarding journalistic neutrality and has been very criticized by the defender of freedom 
of speech.  
As already mentioned, the SD describes itself as a national-conservative party 
and in their “de-demonization” process they tried to get rid of any of their negative 
labels. Although, in 2013, after a journalist has been sued for having called the SD a 
xenophobic party, the Swedish Broadcasting Commission (Granskningsnämnden för 
radio och TV), a government agency, stated “the Board sees no reason in the light of the 
2011 Program principles, to change the assessment that it is not contrary to the 
requirements of impartiality and objectivity to describe the SD as a xenophobic party” 
(Myndigheten för radio och tv, Beslut, 2013). 
Eventually, negative labels such as “neo-Nazi”, “neo-fascist”, “xenophobic” or 
“anti-immigration”, are very recurrent in articles dealing with the SD and also in the 
mouth of many representatives of mainstream parties even in the mouth of the new 
Prime Minister Löfven who re-launched the debate on how to label the SD when he 
wrote in a debate tribune for the Dagens Nyheter : “Here we have a small neo-fascist 
party that believes that they will have a decisive influence and set the agenda for the 
Swedish policy” (Dagens Nyheter, ‘Även Löfven kallar SD nyfascistiskt’, December 
2014). 
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To conclude, the SD has been from the beginning clearly politically ostracized 
and also stigmatized by the other politicians and the media. 
Nevertheless, if this “ignoring and stigmatizing strategy” might have prevented the SD 
to have influence in the Riksdag; the long-term result of such a strategy is more 
questionable and the SD might have gained from it. First of all it has consolidates the 
SD’s rhetoric of victimization and also legitimizing their anti-elites discourse. Finally, 
silencing the SD on their single-issue and not confronting them could passively 
legitimizing their discourse, or at least letting them on the monopole of the issue. 
The result of the 2014 elections have indeed proved that the strategy of ignoring and 
stigmatizing the SD have had the intended consequences and mainstream parties might 
have to re-think their approach towards it. 
 
 4.2.2. From “ignoring” the SD to isolation strategy: The December 
Agreement 
 
After the political turmoil created by the rejection of the budget proposed by the freshly 
formed Löfven cabinet at the beginning of December, Sweden was preparing itself for a 
snap election in March 2015.  
Despite some difference in prognostics about the new election, all showed the 
stabilization of SD’s position as 3rd biggest party and maybe an increase in its score. 
The SD made it clear, right after the announcement of new elections that they would 
push their single-issue as the main topic of the elections as Karlsson the SD’s interim 
leader stated during a press conference: “The Swedish Democrats want the election to 
be a referendum on immigration” (Presse Conference, 3rd December 2014). The SD 
indeed saw the new election as a possibility to push even more their issue on 
immigration and to turn it as a “de facto referendum” about immigration. Nevertheless, 
at their biggest surprise, on December 27th, Löfven cancelled the snap election and after 
secret negotiations between the leaders the Greens, the Centre Party, the Moderates, the 
Liberals and the Christian Democrats, an historical agreement was adopted, the so-
called December agreement:  
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“The political conditions prevailing in Sweden means that it is likely that Sweden will 
be governed by minority governments in the coming years, but it has become more 
difficult than before. Against this background, we make an agreement to make Sweden 
possible to govern” 
      December agreement (see appendix 1) 
 
This agreement is firstly an agreement on new voting practices applied at least 
until 2022 and on the practice it means that the smaller political forces or blocks would 
abstain for voting for their own budget proposal if it threatens to bring down the main 
political force’s proposal in the main voting. What it means for Sweden right now is 
that the Löfven government will thus continue to assume its role when the other parties 
would make it easier for them to pass their budget and to ensure the good functioning of 
the Sweden’s government. 
This agreement was very controversial and seen as an undemocratic deal, especially by 
the two parties that where not invited to the negotiations: the Left and the SD. The SD’s 
reaction was very strong and it accused the mainstream parties to go one more time 
against the will of the people and the democratic game, putting back the debate about 
party ostracization and minority government as Karlsson told the Tindnigarnas 
Telegrambyrå news agency: "I think it's startling that they go against the fundamental 
principles of democracy. What it's done is introduce a set of rules where a minority can 
control a majority" (‘Sweden Democrats blast election U-turn’, The Local Sweden, 
2014). 
The agreement of course raises many debates and discussion about political 
practices, but it is mostly a strategy to avoid the SD to threaten the functioning of 
Swedish politics by bringing down every minority government, which does not meet its 
political views, so to say any government that does not curb rising immigration: "It is 
clear that they are attacking us. Now there are six parties in government and one 
opposition party" (ibid.). The December agreement should thus be seen as an historical 
event in Swedish politics as for the first time in the parliamentary history of Sweden, 
the mainstream parties clearly created a “cordon sanitaire” and from a strategy of 
“ignoring the pariah party” they switch to the strategy of political isolation. Though it 
does not take the form of a proper parliamentary coalition, it can be related to a form of 
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a context-linked legislative agreement, some academics such as Jacob Christensen 
(2014) sees in it a “curious creature” which could be compared to a derived form of 
grand coalition: “It is a grand coalition with regard to constitutional matters which 
attempts to cancel the impact of the Sweden Democrats”. In any case, this agreement is 
definitely a form of “cordon sanitaire” as the mainstream parties together and despite 
their very big divergences decided to block any attempt from the SD to fail again a 
government. 
If to some extent it shows the determination of the mainstream parties to contain 
the SD’s influence on Swedish politics, the risk remains that it would only strengthen 
the position of the SD in the electorate and if so far the other parties managed to find a 
compromise and are mostly rejecting any possibility of cooperation with the SD, future 
political and social context could change this new status quo. 
 
 4.2.4. An unanimous political ostracization? 
 
Although every party have openly and strongly confirmed their opposition to any kind 
of discussion or alliance with the SD during the election campaign and after the results, 
some voices have raised from mainstream parties about considering the possibility of a 
coalition with the SD during the government formation period.  
 One of the most surprising and somehow unexpected reactions came from within 
the Social Democratic Party. In October 2014, the social democrat Widar Andersson 
former leader of the parliament (1994-1998), former EU MP (2004-2009) and chief 
redactor of the newspaper Folkbladet wrote an editorial, which shacked the S. In this 
article, the politician criticized the exclusion of the SD from any coalition discussion 
and advised the future Prime Minister Löfven to “let the anxious and politically correct 
considerations away” (Friatider, ‘S-bråk om samarbete med SD’, October 2014) and start 
engaging discussion with the SD.  
 Moreover, though the political leaders of the Alliance parties remained pretty 
clear on their rejection of cooperation with the SD, some statistics show that their voters 
have another opinion on the question. According to the public opinion research center 
IPSOS Sweden, it appeared that voters from the different mainstream parties have 
different perception on the issue of cooperating or ostracizing the SD as we can see in 
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survey results published by IPSOS in September 2014 answering the question “Do you 
believe that the other parties in parliament should cooperate with the Sweden 
Democrats on issues where they have similar ideas or do you feel that you should do 
everything to reduce their influence in parliament?”: 
 
Figure 6: IPSOS 2014,“Red-green (S and G) voters believe more often that the parties 
should do everything possible to reduce the SDs influence in parliament”4 
              
 
The results are pretty surprising when compared with the discourses of political 
representatives, and as it was mentioned in the theoretical part, the right-wing voters are 
more appealed by cooperation with the SD, nevertheless the result of the Red-green 
voters stating that the parties should cooperation in the parliament with the SD is 
surprisingly high. 
 Those results raise many questions on the future of the SD’s ostracization. With 
growing votes for the SD, disappointing scores in the elections for the mainstream 
parties and an increase of mainstream parties’ voters thinking that the parties should 
collaborate with the SD, it seems that the ostracization of the SD might not last long. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 legend: “samarbeta”= to work with ; “göra allt för att minska SDs inflytande”= “to do everything to 
reduce the influence of the SD”; “osäker/vet ej” = do not know 
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To summarize the analysis of the political ostracization of the SD, it appears 
clearly that the mainstream parties are still officially ostracizing the SD and they even 
changed their strategy and hardened it by creating a “cordon sanitaire”. According our 
conceptualization, the SD remains thus a pariah party that every other party is trying to 
prevent from political influence. Nevertheless some important signs are showing that 
this ostracization is fragile in the sense that voters’ opinion on the attitude to adopt 
towards the SD is changing and balancing towards cooperation. By supposing that the 
SD will improve its scores, for how long will or can this political “front” against the SD 
last? According to the different coalition theories, can Swedish parties continue to reject 
partnership with the SD at the risk of losing power or governing with weak minority 
government? It thus seems that in the coming years, if the mainstream parties’ results 
remain low and the SD continue to rise, we might expect a change in the official 
position of the mainstream parties towards the SD. 
 
 	  
4.3. The influence of the SD in the Riksdag and on the party system 
 
 4.3.1. The SD legislative influence: 2010-2014 
 
With only 20 MPs in the Riksdag between 2010 and 2014, it is easy to imagine that the 
influence of the SD has not been so strong, except if they would have been the support 
party of another party. 
Through the official documents of the Riksdag, we can already provide a brief outlook 
of the influence and role of the SD. 
 
• Votes of parliament proposals: 
According to the document summarizing the votes of the 20 SD MPs5, we can 
already draw a general overview: 
- In total the SD voted 2426 times out of 2701 for or against a proposal, which means 
that they abstain (by absence or abstention) 275 times. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  all	  the	  results	  from	  votes,	  the	  questions	  to	  the	  government,	  the	  interpellations	  and	  the	  motions	  have	  been	  found	  on	  the	  official	  archives	  of	  the	  Riksdag	  taken	  between	  september	  2010	  and	  september	  2014,	  available	  from	  :	  http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-­‐Lagar/	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- They voted 829 times against the winning majority (against motions proposed by 
the government and later adopted by the Riksdag) 
- They voted 1597 times for the winning majority  
- They voted 4 times against a proposal from the government which was later not 
adopted 
- They voted also 4 times in favor of a proposal from the government and which has 
been rejected by the Riksdag 
 
• Questions to the Government 
The SD asked 53 “Questions to the Government” (frågot) from a total of 3003 
questions asked (1.76%) 
 
• Interpellations 
They made 42 interpellations of the Parliament from a total of 1948 interpellations 
(2.15%) 
 
• Motions 
- The SD took part in 1271 motions, so almost 8.9% of the motions presented to the 
parliament. 
- In the 1271 motions, 1074 were proposed by the SD as a party or by one of the 
SD MP (84.5%) 
- No motions were proposed in cooperation with another party.  
 
 First, according to the votes, it seems that the SD’s influence on motion votes has 
not had a strong impact on the final votes. Then, looking at the different statistics for 
motions, interpellations and questions, we can state that SD’s participation has not been 
particularly dynamic. However, if we take the statistics from the other two smallest 
parties which were in the parliament, the Vänsterpartiet (the Left or V) and the Christian 
Democrats (CD), we should underline that SD has been more active regarding 
production of motions, though most of them have not led to any “followed motions” 
(följdmotioner). 
 So, to dress a general assessment, we could say that the SD’s influence and role in 
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the Riksdag between 2010 and 2014 has not been particularly strong, which of course 
comes out mostly from the few number of MPs. It is nevertheless interesting to notice 
that for an opposition and anti-system party, the SD abstained to vote only 10.2% and 
moreover they voted almost 59% of the time for the winning majority. We can thus 
notice that for a an opposition party, the SD has not especially played the game of 
opposition and shows actually one more time the single-issue profile of the party whose 
most of the motions, interpellations or questions have been related to immigration. 
 Finally, most of their motions have not been supported by other parties, thus 
without any backing from other parties, a small number of MPs and a weak position 
regarding other issues than their “champion issues”, the SD thus appeared to have had a 
weak influence on the legislative process. 
 
 4.3.2. September 2014: A new “earthquake election”? 
 
Results’ analysis 
In 1973, during the so called “earthquake elections”, Norway and Denmark have seen 
the emergence of two RRWPPs - the Danish Progress Party and the Norwegian 
Progress Party-, an event that deeply shook the party system of the two countries. 
Afterwards, the two parties became an integrated part of the political landscape whether 
by integrating a ruling coalition or by becoming an important support party for different 
governments. So can we consider the last Swedish election an earthquake election? Has 
the SD benefited from the results and managed to get rid of its pariah status by 
becoming the third largest party in the country?  
 
 On the 14th of September, Sweden national elections have shaken the whole 
country and Swedish politics. First of all those elections saw the defeat of the center-
right “Alliance for Sweden” coalition with 23.3% - 7% less than in the 2010 elections.  
With 31.0%, the Social Democrats became the first party in Sweden and after 8 years of 
opposition, it had finally the possibility to form a government but after days of 
negotiations, they only obtained the participation of the Green – which got 6.9%- in a 
minority coalition government. The real winners of those elections have not been the 
Social Democrats, still registering one of their lowest scores in history, but the Sweden 
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Democrats, which more than doubled its score with 12.9%. Except of the Left party, 
which gained 0.1 % compared to the last elections, all the other main parties of Sweden 
registered also lower results than in 2010.  
 
Figure 7: Results of the 2014 elections 
Party Results in % Seats won 
Social Democrats 31.0 113 
Green Party 6.9 25 
Moderates 23.3 84 
Centre Party 6.1 22 
Liberal People’s Party 5.4 19 
Christian Democrats 4.6 16 
Sweden Democrats 12.9 49 
Left Party 5.7 21 
Feminist Initiative 3.1 0 
Sources: Valmyndigheten available from: http://www.val.se/val/val2014/valnatt/R/rike/ 
 
 The task was difficult for the Social Democrats to form a government but 
eventually, on the 3rd of October, Stefan Löfven, leader of the S and appointed new 
Prime Minister, managed to form a two parties minority government with the Green 
party, the weakest minority government in the history of Sweden with roughly 37.9% of 
votes and 138 seats in the Riksdag (only 39.5% of the seats). It is also the first time in 
history that the Greens make it to the government and the first time that the S has to 
govern with a coalition. The choice to rule with such a weak coalition has been difficult 
and controversial, the S having received on the one side a coalition rejection from the C 
and having made the choice not to form a coalition with the Left and with the SD. 
The last elections have thus shown a more polarized vote and Swedish politics, 
historically based on two-block politics with most of the votes going to the two biggest 
traditional parties – the Social Democrats and the Moderates – seems to sway. It is also 
important to notice that even smaller parties such as the Greens registered some low 
scores in comparison with “newer” parties such as the SD or even the very young 
Feminist Initiative. 
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Outcome of the election for the SD 
Despite the strong rejection to form any kind of partnership or coalition with the SD, it 
is there are some evidences of the advancement of the SD in its institutionalization and 
maybe its slow acceptation. 
First of all, with almost 13% of the votes, the SD has been granted, though with 
reluctance, one of the three deputy speaker positions (andra vice talman) in the Riksdag 
as traditionally the positions should be granted to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th biggest parties in. 
The Riksdag describes in this terms the role of the Speaker (and thus according to that 
to the vice-speakers):  
“The Speaker is the Riksdag's principal representative, and as such directs and 
organises the Riksdag's work procedures. 
The Speaker's tasks include presiding over the meetings of the Chamber. He is assisted 
by three Deputy Speakers. 
The Speaker is the Riksdag's principal representative, and as such directs and organizes 
the Riksdag's work procedures. The Speaker's tasks include presiding over the meetings 
of the Chamber. He is assisted by three Deputy Speakers.” (Sveriges Riksdag, How the 
Riksdag works, The Speaker). 
Björn Söder became then the second deputy speaker6, which is clearly making the SD 
more visible in the new parliament and give them a greater influence. This choice has 
been very controversial and some politics from different parties have reacted strongly to 
it or are not recognizing him as their deputy speaker especially after several very 
controversial declarations of Söder. Despite the fact that the selection of deputy 
speakers is only a political and historical “practice”, not following it and refusing to 
grant one position to the SD might have been very controversial too and seen as un-
democratic. Nevertheless, despite the “practice rule”, the vote for the second vice 
deputy speaker, vote that should be made within different candidates of the 3rd biggest 
party, had shown the reluctance of other parties.  It took indeed three rounds to elect 
Söder -only candidates- the two first rounds being based on the majority support. It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 see official report from the Riksdag ; http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-
Lagar/Kammaren/Protokoll/Protokoll-2014151-Mandagen-d_H2091/ 
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only after the third round based on ballot that Söder was elected and received 52 votes 
against 292 blank votes. The result was inevitable as Söder was the only candidate of 
his party to stand for the vote and as the other MPs had only the choice between voting 
for him or abstaining. This election can already prove how complex it can be to 
ostracize a party that entered the system and a parliament while respecting the system 
rules and the political practices. If the high number of blank votes was mostly symbolic, 
it showed the deep reluctance of other parties to accept the SD, but it is important to 
mention that, nevertheless, on the 52 votes for Söder, only 46 could come from the SD 
MPs (only 46 of them were present that day)7, which still let us with 6 MPs from other 
parties that have voluntarily voted for him and could thus show that within the other 
parties, some people might have started to consider the SD as normalized.  
 Moreover, with its high score during the last election, the SD has also increased 
its presence in the committees and is now on represented by 6 MPs out of 17 committee 
members. A committee only has the responsibilities of preparing cases on its specific 
area and making reports with proposals for parliamentary decisions, although with a 
bigger number of MPs present in each committees, the SD is firstly much more visible 
and has more chance to influence the process if possible. 
 
 Thanks to the Riksdag’s practices and its electoral results, the SD has thus 
managed, despite the political ostracization to reach symbolic and nonetheless important 
positions in the Riksdag and then paved the way towards more institutionalization. 
 
 4.3.3. The budget adoption issue 
 
With such a weak minority, the Löfven government was aware from the beginning that 
it would be a difficult task to pass its own budget. Nevertheless, the result of the votes 
proved to be much more crucial and the consequences much more negative than 
expected as it brought down the government. 
 It was clear since the election campaign that whatever the result of the elections, 
the Alliance would in any case submit their own budget proposal and vote against the 
one from the winning coalition, which eventually happened. On the other side, the SD 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 statistics found at http://www.dn.se/valet-2014/bjorn-soder-ny-vice-talman/ 
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also submit its own budget proposal and voted against the one proposed by the 
government as the SD strongly opposed the part of the budget accorded to immigration 
and asylum policies. 
 The first round of the vote thus saw no adoption of budget and call for a second 
election which would become much more crucial and would show the complexity of 
political cooperation and strategies. Several options were possible if Löfven lost the 
second vote, but much of them, though possible on the paper would not be acceptable in 
the practice.  The first one was to rule with the opposition budget a scenario, which was 
ruled out by Löfven and seen as not so probable to happen. The second one would have 
been to accept bigger compromise to deal with the Alliance at the risk of losing the 
Green support. Finally the last one was to call for a new national election in a short 
timing, which would be very risky considering the already low scores of the S during 
the last one. 
 During the second round of budget vote, the SD happened to not follow one of the 
traditional “political practices” and in spite of only voting against the government’s 
budget, they voted instead for the Alliance budget and this brought down the Löfven 
government. This historical event is not only proving the growing influence and power 
of the SD, it also raised some important issues regarding the game theory and coalition 
strategy.  
 On the one hand, the SD took also a risk by bringing down the government and 
going back to elections, but as a pariah party there was no possibility at this stage to 
enter any discussions with any of the other parties. Moreover, if Löfven did not call for 
new election but decided to re-negotiate with the Alliance, Löfven would have had to 
resign and the Green must have been out of office, an important victory for the SD. 
 In an article following the budget vote, Nicholas Aylott made a very precise 
analysis of the results and the events, eventually stating, “Sweden’s battle over the 2014 
budget was part of a struggle for the orientation of the Swedish party system. In this 
struggle, the Alliance accepted the attendant risk of provoking a new election. In the 
end, so did the Social Democrats” (Aylott N., 2014). With their two-block conception 
of the party system, we might wonder if the mainstream parties have understood the 
new issues that the SD results have raised and their consequences for Swedish politics 
and political system. 
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 4.3.4.The end of the Swedish party system model? 
 
There is no point to deny that the last decades have been a period of important political 
changes, nevertheless, as Peter Mair argued in Party system change, approaches and 
interpretations (1997), the notion of “party system change” has to be taken very 
carefully and not confused with other political changes which mirrored the changes in 
social structures. They reflect an important change in the electoral behavior and the 
structural change of the society: the process of partisan de-alignment has become more 
and more important, electoral volatility is high and the confidence in parties decrease 
for the benefit of non-mainstream parties.  
There is also a change in political practice with a tendency to shift from “class 
politics” to “issue politics” but also in the political communication, campaigns and 
images, which had also evolved in parallel with the society and the new mods of living 
and new technologies and communication; nevertheless the systemic impact of those 
changes should be put into perspective. First of all, despite the general trend of partisan 
de-alignment and trust in parties, the parties as institutions remain extremely dominant 
in elections, which can be also seen in the changes in the anti-establishment or anti-
party parties which, in order to gain political influence and role, have to institutionalize 
and to adapt into the classical form of political parties.  
 A party system, as Mair reminds us, “clearly involves more than the sum of its 
component (party) parts, and incorporates some element of understanding of the mode 
of interaction between these parties”, thus regarding the current Swedish party system, 
the extent of “party system” change should not be exaggerated. So there have been 
some changes in the electoral behavior and in the number of parties but it should not be 
considered as sufficient to talk about change in party system. Moreover, it is important 
to acknowledge a strong core persistence of the three traditional class parties since the 
World War II, even though they are losing some electorate, they still register some high 
scores especially in comparison with other European traditional parties. 
 But once again, what makes the concept of “party system change” a complex 
issue is the fact that it has often been confused with “electoral change” and “party 
change”, both notions that can hardly be considered as stable as they are reflecting also 
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the changes in society. Nevertheless, as Arter highlights in the article “Big Bang” 
elections and party system change in Scandinavia: Farewell to the “enduring party 
system?” (2011), the concept of frozen (Rokkan and Lipset) or enduring Scandinavian 
party system (Sundberg) should also be put into question. As Mair eventually 
underlines, testing a party system change should focus on the “pattern among the 
parties”. Thus, indicators such as electoral volatility, party changes, ideology changes or 
new parties could get systemic relevance and influence on the interactions between 
parties. The growth of support for populist anti-establishment parties has shown an 
increasing polarization of the party system.  
 Besides, the emergences a party difficult to place on the left-right scale such as the 
SD, proved the switch from a “unidimensional” to a “multidimensional” party system 
and, thus challenge the traditional pattern of coalition formation. It is also important to 
underline that the events following the 2014 elections have proved the tricky use of 
“practices”, which despite being traditional and historical, are not written anywhere. 
These are those practices themselves, which benefited the SD whether by forcing the 
other mainstream, in order not to look un-democratic, to follow them and grant some 
key positions to the SD; or by being bypassed by the SD during the vote of the budget 
for instance. 
 All in all, the extent of party system change in Sweden remains a very difficult 
issue to determine. The recent political developments could prove that the Swedish 
system is not anymore such a stable or “frozen” party system. Despite changes in social 
structures and political behaviors or parties, we might indeed keep in mind the 
exceptional core persistence of the traditional parties in the electorate and in history as 
well as on the policy-making process in the system, and thus the extent of party system 
change in Sweden should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the results of the last 
elections, seeing new and recent parties remaining in the Riksdag such as the SD and V, 
proves that changes are occurring on the electoral and party level, which might lead in 
the near future to a definitive party system change. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
 5.1. The SD: kingmakers or troublemakers? 
 
When the first election results came up during the night of the 14th of September, the 
excitation was at his height within the SD members. The party scored indeed 12.9% and 
became the third biggest national party: “we are the absolute kingmakers now” (The 
Local Sweden, ‘Reinfeldt steps down after election defeat’, September 2014) told 
Åkesson to the reporters right after the results. 
 As it has been explained in the data analysis, despite some high results and the 
coalition deal proposed by the SD, the Social Democrats chose without any hesitation to 
refuse it and rather lead an uneasy minority government with the Green party. 
For the second time (first in 2010), the SD was expecting the call of the winning party 
to make a coalition and did not get it, but as Jimmie Åkesson pointed out, they became 
an important force in the Swedish political landscape and a new pivotal party. 
Theoretically, a minority government can successfully lead a government; nevertheless 
the second vote of the budget and the fall down of the government following the vote of 
the SD showed the weakness of the Löfven minority coalition. 
Can we thus see the SD as the new kingmaker party or has it been only a political 
“troublemaker” opposition party?  
 On the one hand, the budget adoption proved that the SD had the power to bring 
down a government and to force new elections to happen. On the other hand, the 
concept of “kingmaker” might be exaggerated because not only the electoral weight of a 
party should be taken into account. 
 First of all, the December agreement and the “cordon sanitaire” built up by the 
other mainstream parties have proved that the SD has not yet reached a level of political 
acceptation from the other parties and is still not considered as a potential coalition 
partner neither an acceptable support party.  
 Secondly, looking at the data of their role in the Riksdag between 2010 and 2014, 
it appeared that the SD only had a very weak influence, not only taking into account the 
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fact that they had only 20 MPs. This can be related to the fact that, except on the topic 
of immigration and nationalism, the SD has shown a lack of political content regarding 
other issue areas.  
 Despite some evolution in the elaboration of its political program, the SD remains 
a single-issue party and in order to become a real “kingmaker” in the Riksdag it will 
need to develop deeper its ideology and policy program, maintain its high scores in the 
polls, as well as continue to distance itself of its negative image. Nevertheless, the 
growing importance of the SD is undeniable and it raised many questions regarding the 
approach to the Swedish party system as a whole. 
 
 
5.2. Class-de-alignment, party polarization and ostracization: how to tackle 
the rise of a pariah party 
 
 
If it might be too early to talk about a big change in Swedish party system itself, the rise 
of the SD has forced the mainstream parties to confront new issues and to re-think their 
political strategies. 
In a study published in January 2015 - Room for re-alignment: Working-Class 
sympathy for Sweden Democrats – Maria Oskarson and Maria Demker underlines 
different reasons that have benefited the rise of SD during the recent years.  
First of all, as it was already mentioned, there has been an obvious change in political 
alignment of voters in Sweden and the decline of class voting in a country where “the 
association between voters class positions and party sympathy has long been among the 
strongest in the Western world” (2015), especially looking at the decline of the Social 
Democrats and their recent results. 
Secondly and most importantly for our purpose, this re-alignment is also the result of 
the current change in party system, especially the weakening of mainstream parties’ 
polarization. Still according to the study of Oskarson and Demker, the last decades have 
shown a polarization of the mainstream parties in Sweden, especially the two biggest 
ones the Social Democrats and the Moderates regarding market economy and welfare: 
 
“Altogether, the ideological climate, with increasing similarities between the major left 
and major right parties on the supply side, combined with remaining attitudinal 
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cleavages (rather than decreasing tolerance to refugees) on the demand side and the 
decrease in traditional class voting, could be seen as providing a favorable opportunity 
structure for the Sweden Democrats”. 
 
So what to preconize to the mainstream parties? Has ostracization been the right 
strategy to employ? The debate remains open but looking at what happened in other 
European countries and taking into account the specificities of Sweden we can still find 
some food for thoughts. 
If the “isolation”/”ignoring strategy in Sweden has permitted for some decades 
to maintain RRWPPs out of the political game, the situation has changed with the SD 
and this long lasting ostracization strategy might have given more attention to the SD as 
it was actually planed and expected. The SD has indeed well used the victimhood 
argument pointing out a lack of democracy and the limitation of their freedom of speech 
by being excluded from the public debate and the media as well as being always 
associated to neo-Nazi, fascist and xenophobic labels. This “victimization” of the SD, 
associated to the general decrease in political trust and the populist strategies employed 
by the SD could have thus created also certain sympathy towards it in opposition to the 
mainstream politics and parties, as Vidhya Ramalingam underlines: 
 
“SD have demonstrably gained from some elements of their stigma, exemplified by the 
Danish call for election observers to monitor violations of democracy against SD and 
the increased audience the party received after their election film was banned from 
Swedish television stations” (Ramalingam V., 2012). 
 
 Moreover, by avoiding the debate on immigration, the mainstream parties have 
led a room for the SD to spread their views on the issue in a context rather favorable for 
them with the number of asylum seekers growing and the controversies of some riots in 
some neighborhoods with a high number of immigrants. Even in the December 
agreement the issue of immigration has been avoided and it might, in the near future, 
lead to more frustration and misunderstanding in the public opinion. 
 If it seems easy to affirm that the mainstream parties should right now discuss the 
immigration issue but the way to do it is much more complicated and tricky as the 
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experience of other European countries can show. There is a high risk that by doing it in 
a wrong manner it could rather benefit and legitimize the SD. In France for instance, in 
response to the growing number of people voting for the Front National, a RPP with a 
strong anti-immigration even xenophobic discourse, some mainstream parties have 
made the mistake to tackle the topic by using the same rhetoric strategies and 
vocabulary to “catch-up” voters from the FN as Aurélien Mondon (2013) analyzed it 
with accuracy in his study of the 2007 national elections when despite the FN low score 
(at least lower than expected), the co-optation by mainstream parties of FN’s rhetoric 
gave credit to their ideas or how “an electoral defeat proved an ideological victory” . 
One of the biggest mistake made by some mainstream politics was thus to try to 
catch voters from the RRWPPs by using the same rhetorical tools as them and putting 
electoral ambitions as a priority. If the strategy seems at the beginning to work, looking 
at polls results, the ideological consequences are much more negative. A shift from the 
mainstream parties towards a more right-wing politics concerning nationalism and 
immigration, associated to the moderation (at least on the appearance) of RRWPPs 
leads to a convergence that could only benefit the RRWPPs at the end make them 
become potential coalition partners and definitely get rid of their pariah status. If so far, 
this convergence has not yet happened in Sweden, the way mainstream parties will deal 
or not with immigration issue will be crucial.  
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CONCLUSION: 	  	  
In 2010 Sweden has experienced the breakthrough into the parliament of a radical right-
wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats. Since its creation at the end of the 80s, the 
media as well as the mainstream political parties have ostracized the SD, ostracization 
that consists mostly in ignoring the party and stigmatizing it. In the following elections, 
instead of decreasing, the SD obtained much more votes that in 2010 and managed to 
become the 3rd biggest party in Sweden. 
From what could have been seen in 2010 as a one-time event, turned to be really 
different as the SD established itself quite comfortably in the polls and in the 
parliament. Although the SD never managed to enter any form of political cooperation 
with the other parties, which still considered it as a radical and non-acceptable partner, 
it still managed to create a political crisis following the budget adoption vote and 
brought down the already fragile Red-Green governing coalition. 
The main question of this work was thus to see if the label “pariah party” can be 
applied to the SD and to which extent. It has been firstly found out that the SD is in the 
process of institutionalization but it remains mostly a single-issue party with a lack of 
proper content and policies regarding other issues. Secondly, despite trying to improve 
its image and “de-demonize” itself, the party is still struggling to get rid off its negative 
image and labels within the media and the politicians. Moreover it appeared that the SD 
has not yet sufficiently institutionalized in order to have a real weight in the parliament 
as we have observed through their role in the parliament between 2010 and 2014. 
By analyzing the attitude of the mainstream parties towards the SD, it appears 
clearly that all the parties are still ostracizing the SD and have used different strategies 
to prevent its influence in the political game and eventually the main parties, despite 
their political and ideological disagreements, managed to pass in 2014 an agreement and 
form a new type of “cordon sanitaire” against the SD. 
According to our conceptualization of “pariah party”, we can thus confirm that 
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the SD is still a “pariah party”. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the SD is willing to 
bypass this pariah status and might in the near feature become a potential cooperation 
partner. The breakthrough of the SD in the polls especially in September 2014 has 
proved that the long lasting “Swedish party system model” is shaking and slowly 
changing from a unidimensional to multidimensional system. Parties that used to 
comfortably share the majority of the votes and manage to govern even with a minority 
government are experiencing decreasing scores due to their polarization and class-de-
alignment. It appears also that mainstream parties’ own voters’ attitude towards the SD 
is changing, especially for the voters’ of the center-right Alliance for Sweden (see 
appendix 2: graphic from IPSOS published in April 2015), and the trend is balancing 
toward an acceptation of the SD as partner.  
The 2014 election has also given the SD a better visibility in the parliament, they 
gained for instance the position of vice Deputy Speaker and they also had the 
opportunity to place more of its MPs in the different parliamentary committees. Those 
elections and the events following it have shown the capacity of the SD to play with the 
parliamentary practices at their own benefit. 
Finally, it is difficult to really assess the positive consequences of the SD’s 
political ostracization on the long-term, and so far it has proved to block them to 
increase their influence in the parliament but not in the public opinion as the growing 
polls can show. One crucial issue for the mainstream parties in the future will also be to 
finally handle the topic of immigration but in an intelligent way, which means by 
avoiding to legitimize the discourse of the SD on the issue but on the contrary to 
deconstruct it. Finally, it is also time that mainstream parties re-think their vision of the 
Swedish party system and understand that Sweden is slowly moving from a 
unidimensional party system towards a multidimensional one. 
The SD thus remains a “pariah party” but one might not predict if this status will 
last for long and looking at the political trend in Europe or in the other Nordic countries, 
it is not improbable to imagine the SD as support party or coalition partner for a 
Swedish government in the near future. 
 
 
 
	   71	  
ABBREVIATIONS: 
 
C    Center Party 
CD   Christian Democrats 
DF    Dansk Folkeparti or Danish People’s Party 
FN   Front National 
FPÖ   Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
FrP    Fremskrittspartiet or Norwegian Progress Party 
G             Green Party 
M      Moderates 
ND   New Democracy 
RRWPP  Radical Right-Wing Populist Party 
SD   Sweden Democrats 
V   Vänsterpartiet or the Left 
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Appendix: Voters’ opinion on cooperation with the Sweden Democrats in parliament, in 
April 2015 (archives from IPSOS.se) 
 
 
  
 	  
